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policies targeted at firms incentivize investment and improve firm financial conditions?, and 2) Do the
effects of consumer credit on household well-being vary with differing economic states?
In the first chapter, I examine the effects of a countercyclical fiscal policy that relaxed firm financial
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design strategy that takes advantage of a discontinuity in the slope of the tax refund formula. I find that
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passage of the 2009 policy, in contrast, firms used the refunds to increase cash holdings ($0.96 of every
refund dollar) before paying down debt in the following year. While the policy had no discernable effect on
investment in the most recent recessionary period, it did reduce firms' bankruptcy risk and the probability
of a future credit rating downgrade.
In the second chapter, I provide empirical evidence that access to credit has state-dependent effects on
household material well-being, even within the market for one credit product--in my case, payday lending.
Using detailed data on household location and consumption patterns, I show that access to payday credit
lowers material well-being in "normal" states of the world. Loan access results in substantial declines in
nondurable goods spending overall and in housing-related spending particularly. Following temporary
negative shocks, however--extreme weather events like hurricanes and blizzards--I show that payday loan
access helps households smooth consumption and improves material well-being. After extreme weather
events, loan access mitigates declines in spending on food, mortgage payments, and home repairs.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN CORPORATE AND HOUSEHOLD FINANCE
Christine L. Dobridge
David Musto

This dissertation studies two questions in corporate and household finance: 1) Can fiscal stimulus
policies targeted at firms incentivize investment and improve firm financial conditions?, and 2) Do
the effects of consumer credit on household well-being vary with differing economic states?
In the first chapter, I examine the effects of a countercyclical fiscal policy that relaxed firm
financial constraints by giving firms additional tax refunds. To estimate the policy’s impact, I use a
regression kink design strategy that takes advantage of a discontinuity in the slope of the tax
refund formula. I find that after passage of the 2002 policy, firms allocated $0.40 of every tax
refund dollar to investment. After passage of the 2009 policy, in contrast, firms used the refunds
to increase cash holdings ($0.96 of every refund dollar) before paying down debt in the following
year. While the policy had no discernable effect on investment in the most recent recessionary
period, it did reduce firms’ bankruptcy risk and the probability of a future credit rating downgrade.
In the second chapter, I provide empirical evidence that access to credit has state-dependent
effects on household material well-being, even within the market for one credit product—in my
case, payday lending. Using detailed data on household location and consumption patterns, I
show that access to payday credit lowers material well-being in “normal” states of the world. Loan
access results in substantial declines in nondurable goods spending overall and in housingrelated spending particularly. Following temporary negative shocks, however—extreme weather
events like hurricanes and blizzards—I show that payday loan access helps households smooth
consumption and improves material well-being. After extreme weather events, loan access
mitigates declines in spending on food, mortgage payments, and home repairs.
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CHAPTER 1: Fiscal Stimulus and Firms: A Tale of Two Recessions
1.1 Introduction
In an attempt to stem severe declines in employment and output during the 2007-2009 recession
and to spur a recovery, the U.S. government enacted an unprecedented level of fiscal stimulus—
1

over $1.5 trillion. A number of stimulus provisions were targeted directly at the corporate sector
with the goals of increasing investment and reducing firm financial distress. We have relatively
scarce empirical evidence on the effects of firm fiscal stimulus, however, and from a theoretical
perspective, the effects of these policies remain unclear. This is in large part because the
measures were implemented in poor economic conditions when firm investment opportunities
may have been weak. In this paper, I study the effects of a fiscal stimulus policy that gave firms
additional tax refunds at the end of the past two recessions. I ask two questions: (1) What do
firms do with fiscal stimulus funds?, and (2) does fiscal stimulus improve firm financial conditions
more broadly?
The policy I study is the five-year carryback of net operating losses. Under the U.S. tax code, any
firm experiencing a net operating loss (NOL) in a particular tax year can receive a refund for taxes
paid in the previous two years—called an NOL “carryback” deduction. In 2002 and 2009,
Congress expanded the carryback window from two years to five years to give additional tax
refunds to firms. The policy was essentially an intertemporal transfer of tax benefits, not a cash
windfall. A firm with an NOL also has the option to carry the NOL forward for 20 years to offset
future taxable income—called an NOL “carryforward” deduction. Under the five-year carryback

1

Major packages passed by the U.S. Congress included a $150 billion package in February 2008, an $830 billion
package in February 2009, a $45 billion package in November 2009, and an $860 billion package in December 2010. For
information on the cost estimates of provisions in these packages, see the following Congressional Budget Office
publications: “H.R. 5140, Economic Stimulus Act of 2008: Cost Estimate” (February 2008), “H.R. 1, American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act: Cost Estimate for the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1” (February 2009), “H.R. 3548, Worker,
Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009: Cost Estimate” (November 2009), “H.R. 4853, Tax Relief,
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010: Cost Estimate” (December 2010), and
“Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on Employment and Economic Output in 2013”
(February 2014).
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extension policy, most firms that received tax refunds would have expected to pay higher taxes in
2

the future due to the reduction in NOL carryforwards available to offset future taxable income.

Estimating the economic effects of fiscal stimulus is challenging due to difficulties disentangling
the effect of the policy from other economic factors influencing firm behavior at the time. In
particular, the empirical challenge in analyzing the five-year carryback extension policy is a
potential endogeneity concern arising from omitted variable and simultaneity issues. Only firms
with losses were eligible to receive refunds, and the firms receiving the largest refunds were
those with the largest losses during the recession and the largest profits during the prior
expansion (e.g., homebuilders in the 2009 policy period). Whether a firm received a tax refund
and the size of a firm’s tax refund could have been correlated, therefore, with other factors driving
firm financial policies and performance, such as unobserved investment opportunities or
managerial quality. In addition, firms had incentives to engage in tax planning to maximize their
refunds, leading to the concern that managers may have chosen the tax refund size based on a
desire to allocate the funds to a specific purpose.
I overcome these challenges by using a regression kink design (RKD) strategy. RKD has similar
features to regression discontinuity design (RDD), but instead of exploiting variation around a
discontinuity in the level of a policy variable of interest as in RDD, it exploits variation around a
discontinuity in the slope of a policy variable (a “kink” in the variable). In my setting, a
discontinuity in slope arises from the statutory formula that determines the size of a firm’s tax
refund. Under U.S. tax law, a firm’s tax refund is based on its current losses and previous-years’
profits. Firms can only offset past tax liability up to the point where previous-years’ taxable income
is equal to current losses. For example, if taxable income in the past five years is larger than
current losses, a firm cannot receive any additional refund beyond the value based on current
losses—the firm already maximized its tax refund at this point. This statutory requirement

2
The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated that in the 2002 policy period, the IRS would issue about $15 billion in
additional refunds to firms, but that the 10-year revenue cost would only be about $2 billion. In the 2009 period, the JCT
estimated the IRS would issue about $38 billion in additional refunds with a 10-year cost of about $11 billion.
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introduces a kink in the slope of the tax refund formula at the point where previous-years’ taxable
income equals current losses. The RKD identification strategy relies on assumptions that are
similar to RDD: that the number of firms is distributed smoothly around the kink point and that
pre-determined firm characteristics evolve smoothly around the kink point (Card, Lee, Pei, and
Weber, 2012). I present evidence that these assumptions appear to hold in my setting.
Policymakers specified two main goals when implementing the five-year carryback policy: to
boost economic growth by increasing investment and employment, and to help firms smooth
3

income and mitigate financial distress. While the policy goals were clear, whether giving firms tax
refunds is effective in achieving these goals is an open question from a theoretical perspective.
To begin, the policy acted as an intertemporal transfer of tax benefits as discussed above—i.e., a
temporary cash flow change. With unrestricted access to financial markets, short-term changes in
cash flow should not affect investment or performance because firms should already be
optimizing their investment and financing policies.

4

The policy did provide firms with liquidity in the short term, however, and theory suggests firms
may have had incentives to use the refunds to increase cash holdings or reduce debt. Firms
facing high idiosyncratic risk may have increased cash due to precautionary savings motives
(Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 1999; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009). Or financially
constrained firms may have increased cash (Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Han and
Qui, 2007) or lowered debt outstanding (Acharya, Almeida, and Campello, 2007) to finance future
investment opportunities. Alternatively, financially constrained firms may have used the tax
refunds to increase investment. A large literature dating back to Fazarri, Hubbard, and Petersen
(1988) shows that cash flow can be important for investment decisions in financially constrained

3

A statement from Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill after passage of the 2002 policy read: “This legislation will add
momentum so that we have a more robust economic recovery and return to full prosperity…. [T]his legislation….will speed
America back to work” (U.S. Treasury, 2002). A statement from the House Ways and Means Committee describing the
2009 policy prior to passage stated that the legislation would give firms “cash infusions that would help them weather the
current economic storm” (Ways and Means Committee, 2009). And a post-passage White House fact sheet stated that
the legislation “creates jobs by cutting taxes for struggling businesses….putting $33 billion of tax cuts in the hands of
businesses this year when they need it most” (White House, 2009).
4
Seminal models include Modigliani and Miller (1958), Tobin (1969), Abel (1983), and Hayashi (1982).
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firms. Finally, the choice of whether to use the tax refund for investment or another use may also
have depended on overall economic conditions, as Bolton, Chen and Wang (2011 and 2013).
Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2013), for example, show that firms are more likely to hoard cash and
reduce investment in a crisis state as compared to a non-crisis state.
To study the effects of the five-year carryback policy, I first examine how firms allocated the tax
refunds. Did firms increase investment or did they choose another use of funds such as
increasing cash holdings, reducing debt, or making payouts to shareholders? Next, I analyze if
the policy improved firm financial positions overall, testing whether receiving a tax refund affected
firm bankruptcy risk, credit ratings, and the probability of bankruptcy or liquidation.
I document two main findings. First, I show that firms chose different uses for the tax refunds in
the two policy periods. After passage of the 2002 policy, I find that firms allocated the funds to
investment ($0.40 of every refund dollar) in the year they received the refund and I find no effect
in the following years. In contrast, I find that after passage of the 2009 policy, firms first held the
tax refunds as cash and then used the refunds to pay down long-term debt. In 2010—the year of
refund receipt—firms allocated $0.96 of every refund dollar to higher cash holdings. Then in 2011,
firms reduced cash holdings and reduced long-term debt outstanding ($1.26 out of every refund
dollar). I find no effects on the use of funds in later years and no effect on investment in any year
of the 2009 policy period. I also find no effects of the policy on the change in employment—a key
policy goal—in either the 2002 period or the 2009 period.
The difference in responses between policy periods is consistent with a hypothesis that firms may
choose different uses of liquidity under different economic conditions, as in Bolton, Chen and
Wang’s (2011, 2013) work. Macroeconomic conditions across the two policy periods were very
different. The 2001 recession was the mildest in post-war history—i.e., one of the shortest
recessions with the smallest real GDP declines—though credit conditions for firms were tight
5

Some of the notable papers in corporate finance regarding financial constraints include, for example, Blanchard, Lopezde-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994), Lamont (1997), Rauh (2006), and Hennessey and Whited (2007). Even when firms are
unconstrained, Gomes (2001) shows that cash flow can be an important determinant of investment when external finance
is costly.
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during and following the recession. The 2007-2009 recession, on the other hand, was the most
severe since the Great Depression, and was characterized by high volatility in markets, weak
expectations for future economic conditions, credit-market freezes, and tight credit conditions
overall. (In Section 1.3, I provide additional background on economic conditions during the two
recessions.)
The use of tax refunds to increase investment in the 2002 period suggests that firms in my
sample were financially constrained, but had profitable investment opportunities at the time. In
line with this hypothesis, I find that the increase in investment was concentrated in financially
constrained firms and in firms with the highest investment opportunities. The finding that in the
2009 policy period, firms used the tax refunds to increase cash holdings is consistent with the
hypothesis that firms built cash either due to a precautionary savings motive in the face of high
uncertainty, or for financially constrained firms to fund future investment opportunities. My results
suggest the uncertainty channel was the larger motivation for firms to increase cash. I find the
cash increase was concentrated among firms with high historical cash-flow volatility and realized
stock-price volatility. I do not see the cash increase concentrated in financially constrained firms.
The second main finding of this paper is that although the policy had no discernable effect on
investment in the 2009 period, it did improve financial conditions overall in that period. I find that
the tax refunds lowered the probability of a future credit rating downgrade and lowered firms’
bankruptcy risk on average (as measured by distance to default, Altman’s z-score, and Ohlson’s
o-score). These findings are consistent with my results that firms first held the tax refunds as cash
in 2010 and then reduced cash in order to pay down long-term debt in 2011. These decisions
would tend to reduce firm riskiness overall. The tax refund policy had a weaker effect on
measures of financial conditions in the 2002 policy period. I only see a small effect on Altman’s zscore. The policy had no effect staving off severe negative outcomes in either period, however. I
find no effect on actual bankruptcy events.

5

I demonstrate that these results are generally robust to the empirical specification—to
implementing a “sharp” RKD strategy instead of the preferred “fuzzy” RKD strategy, to the
polynomial form of the regression specification, to narrowing the regression window around the
kink point, and to excluding industries that were particularly hard hit in each recession
(communications and airlines in 2002 and homebuilders in 2009). I find reasonable estimates of
the average firm tax rate in both policy periods: 34 percent in the 2002 period and 31 percent in
the 2009 period. These estimates are not statistically different from each other and are close to
the top marginal corporate tax rate of 35 percent. Finally, I find no evidence of confounding
interactions with other firm-related fiscal policy measures enacted at the same time, such as
“bonus” depreciation of investment expenses.
This work relates to two major literatures in finance and economics. First, it relates to the
6

literature that provides empirical evidence on the effects of fiscal policy targeted at firms. This
7

paper is the first to study the economic effects of the tax carryback policy. In contrast to previous
literature, I directly consider potential differences in responses across policy periods and show
that firm responses can differ depending on economic conditions. I also study the effects of fiscal
stimulus policies on firm financial conditions more broadly (i.e., bankruptcy risk and credit quality),
in addition to studying how firms used fiscal stimulus funds.

6

A larger body of literature studies the effects of fiscal policy measures directed at consumers or direct government
spending initiatives. For example, Johnson, Parker and Souleles (2006) and Agarwal, Liu and Souleles (2007) show that
the 2001 income tax rebates caused a substantial increase in consumer spending after disbursement, particularly for
liquidity constrained households. Johnson, McClelland, Parker and Souleles (2011) find a similar result for the 2008
economic stimulus payments. Wilson (2010) estimates the effect of spending from the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) broadly and finds that ARRA spending added 0.8 job-years per every $100,000 of
spending. Chodorow-Reich et al. (2011) show the ARRA provisions that increased federal Medicaid aid to states resulted
in an additional 3.8 job-years for every $100,000 in Medicaid spending. Mian and Sufi (2012) study the 2009 “Cash for
Clunkers” policy and find that the policy had a large short-term effect in boosting automobile purchases but that most of
the effect was reversed within the next 10 months.
7
Boyton and Cooper (2003) and Graham and Kim (2009) estimate the total value of the carrybacks and tax refunds to
firms for varying carryback windows, but do not study the effects of the policy as a stimulus measure. Graham and Kim
(2009) also estimate how the carryback policy would affect firm marginal tax rates in the 2009 period and hence, firm debt
ratios, using estimates of the relationship between marginal tax rates and debt from Graham (1996). They estimate that
the Obama Administration’s proposed policy would provide substantial additional liquidity to firms—$19 billion and $34
billion in 2008 and 2009, respectively, which would increase firm debt capacity by $8 and $10 billion in those years. Cohn
(2011) studies the effect of net operating loss carryforwards on firm investment and shows that higher taxes result in firms
reducing investment.
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Analyses of other stimulus policies targeted at firms have found mixed real effects to date. The
most widely studied firm fiscal stimulus policy was the 2004 tax holiday on the repatriation of
foreign earnings. Blouin and Krull (2009) and Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011) find that the
main effect of the holiday was to increase shareholder payouts. This result suggests U.S.
multinational firms were not financially constrained during the policy period. In contrast to the
repatriation holiday, the tax carryback policy explicitly targeted firms with losses during the
recession and not just large, multinational firms. Firms with losses may have been more likely to
be financially constrained and, as I find in the 2002 period, more likely to use the funds for
investment. In this vein, Faulkender and Petersen’s (2012) study of the repatriation holiday shows
that highly financially constrained firms used the repatriated earnings for investment. Studies of
“bonus” depreciation—a policy that accelerated the schedule for deducting investment from
taxable income—also find a substantial effect of the policy on firm investment (House and
Shapiro, 2008; Mahon and Zwick, 2014). Mahon and Zwick’s results suggest that bonus
depreciation’s effect on investment stemmed from a cash-flow channel—by lowering tax liabilities
for financially constrained firms. They show that the policy’s effect on investment is concentrated
among financially constrained firms and profitable firms, not in unconstrained firms or in firms with
losses (hence zero tax liability). In contrast, my sample covers firms with losses and I show the
tax carryback policy increased investment for these firms in the 2002 period.
Second, this paper relates to the literature that studies the role of financial constraints and
uncertainty in propagating business cycles. A large body of work in macroeconomics shows that
financing frictions can cause and amplify business cycles (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Bernanke,
8

Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999). While I am not directly testing implications of these models, my
paper provides empirical evidence on the role that external financial constraints played in the
recoveries from the last two U.S. recessions. My result from the 2002 policy period—that
financially constrained firms used the tax refunds to increase investment—suggests financing
constraints did indeed play a role restraining investment following the 2001 recession. In the 2009
8

Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, and Sannikov (2012) survey the literature on financing frictions in macroeconomics.
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period, in contrast, I find that when the NOL carryback extension lifted firm financial constraints by
providing additional liquidity, firms did not invest the additional funds. Instead, firms held the funds
as cash, which suggests that financing constraints may not have been the key friction restraining
investment after the 2007-2009 recession. My results suggest that instead, high uncertainty may
have been playing a larger role in restraining investment. In particular, I find that the cash
holdings result was concentrated in firms facing higher uncertainty about future prospects. A
rapidly growing literature stemming from work by Bloom (2009) highlights the role of aggregate
uncertainty shocks as another important channel that causes and propagates business cycles.
This work is grounded in the real options theory literature, which shows that firms delay investing
until economic uncertainty is resolved over time or until the benefits of investment become
sufficiently large (Cukierman, 1980; Bernanke, 1983; Pindyck, 1991).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides background on the
applicable U.S. tax code statutes and the NOL carryback policy implementation. Section 1.3 gives
some background on the economic conditions in each policy period and Section 1.4 describes the
empirical strategy and the data sample. I present my results on the effects of the policy in Section
1.5 and conclude in Section 1.6.

1.2 Policy Background
1.2.1 U.S. Tax Code
In any given year, a firm sustains a net operating loss (NOL) for tax purposes when its allowable
tax deductions exceed gross income. Under section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code, these
losses can be used in two ways. First, they can be used to offset taxable income in either of the
prior two years, for which the firm receives a tax refund. This policy is known as an “NOL
carryback.” Alternatively, if the firm does not have positive taxable income in the prior two years or
elects not to use its carryback, it can carry the loss forward for up to twenty years and use it to
offset future taxable income, thereby lowering its tax bill at some point in the future. This is known

8

9

as an “NOL carryforward.” According to the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), “the intent of the
NOL carryback/carryforward provision is to give taxpayers the ability to smooth out changes in
business income, and therefore taxes, over the business cycle.”

10

In 2002 and then again in

2009, Congress enacted legislation extending the NOL carryback window from two years to five
years. I describe each policy action in Section 1.2.2.
I present an example of how the carryback deduction is applied under the two-year policy and the
five-year extension policy in Table 1. The example firm had a $100 million NOL in 2001 (hence, a
maximum potential NOL deduction of $100 million) and profits ranging from $50 million in 1996 to
$10 million in 2000 before taking the NOL deduction into account. I assume a tax rate of 35
percent in each year.
Under the two-year carryback policy, the firm could take a $20 million NOL deduction in 1999 and
a $10 million deduction in 2000—receiving a tax refund of $10.5 million (0.35*$30 million). In this
case, the firm keeps a $70 million NOL to carry forward in the future ($100 million minus $20
million minus $10 million). Under the five-year carryback extension policy, the firm’s tax refund
was substantially larger. This firm could take a $50 million carryback deduction in 1996, a $40
million deduction in 1997 and a $10 million deduction in 1998. Since the firm can now deduct the
full $100 million NOL, it receives the maximum tax refund of $35 million and has no losses
remaining to carry forward. The firm receives an additional $24.5 million as a result of the
carryback extension. (This calculation assumes the firm would take the deductions starting in the
earliest year of the window.)

9

Using an NOL carryforward is fairly straightforward: Firms enter the amount of deduction they would like to take on line
29 of form 1120 when they file their tax returns. In the case of a carryback, they have the option to file form 1139 in the 12
months following the end of the taxable year in which the loss is incurred. After that one year period, they can still use the
carryback and get a refund by filing an amended tax return using Form 1120X. Firms keep track of their NOL carryovers
and report the total on Schedule K of IRS Form 1120. Also on Schedule K firms incurring a loss can make an election to
permanently forego the carryback of that loss. In mergers and acquisitions, there are special rules that limit an acquiring
company’s use of NOLs on the books of a target firm. There are also special rules governing the use of NOLs to offset
Alternative Minimum Taxable Income, governing the use of NOLs for life insurance companies, and governing farming
losses, disaster losses, casualty loss, etc…
10
U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of The Chairman’s Amendment in The Nature
of a Substitute to H.R. 598, The “American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009”, 111th Cong., 1st sess.,
January 22, 2009, JCX-9-09.
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1.2.2 The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 (JCWA)

The JCWA was introduced in October 2001 and signed into law in early March 2002, allowing
firms to carryback losses incurred in tax years 2001 and 2002 for five years instead of the usual
two. Losses in 2001 could be carried back to offset income in 1996, 1997, and 1998, in addition
to income in 1999 and 2000. At the time of passage, the JCT estimated that the NOL provision
would return an additional $7.9 billion in tax refunds to firms in 2002 (for losses incurred in tax
year 2001), and $6.6 billion in tax refunds to firms in 2003 (for tax losses incurred in 2002). Over
a 10-year horizon, the JCT estimated that the NOL provision would have a revenue cost of about
$2 billion, reflecting the future reduction in carryforwards available to offset taxable income. The
JCWA also included measures to extend a number of expiring tax code provisions, to provide an
extra 30 percent first-year expensing for qualified capital investments (known as bonus
depreciation), and to extend unemployment insurance benefits for workers.
1.2.3 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)
The 2009 policy was enacted in two separate pieces of legislation. As part of the ARRA—the
$830 billion stimulus package that was signed into law in February 2009—Congress extended the
carryback window for losses incurred in tax year 2008. This policy was limited to small
businesses, i.e., those with less than an average of $15 million in gross receipts per year over the
previous three years. The JCT estimated that the policy would return $4.7 billion in refunds to
firms in 2009 with a 10-year cost of about $1 billion. The five-year carryback was small relative to
the overall package, which also included an extension of the bonus depreciation allowance (an
extra 50 percent of first-year expensing), a payroll tax credit, an additional child tax credit, and
additional government funding for health care, education, and infrastructure.

11
For cost estimates of each of the three pieces of legislation, see the following Joint Committee on Taxation publications:
Estimated Revenue Effects of the “Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002”, March 6, 2002, JCX-13-02;
Estimated Budget Effects of the Revenue Provisions Contained in the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1, the “American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009”, February 12, 2009, JCX-19-09; and Estimated Revenue Effects of Certain
Revenue Provisions Contained in the “Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009”, November 3,
2009, JCX-45-09.

10

1.2.4 The Worker, Homeowner, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 (WHBA)
The Administration budget released in May 2009 included a proposal to allow the carryback to
apply to all firms and to apply to losses in both 2008 and 2009. Congress introduced legislation to
this effect in September 2009 and passed the WHBA to extend the five-year carryback window in
November 2009. The carryback extension could only be applied to either 2008 losses or 2009
losses, not both. The exception was for firms that qualified for the policy under the ARRA. These
firms were allowed to apply the extension to both years. Firms were only allowed to apply 50
percent of taxable profits in the earliest year of the extension window to the policy. Also, firms that
received assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) were excluded from
participating. The JCT estimated that the policy would return an additional $33 billion to taxpayers
in 2010 and that the expected 10-year cost of the program would be $10.4 billion.

1.3 Empirical Strategy and Data Description
1.3.1 Regression Kink Design Overview
To estimate the effects of providing tax refunds under the five-year carryback policy, I use a
regression kink design (RKD) strategy. This strategy takes advantage of a discontinuity in the
slope of the formula that determines the size of a firm’s tax refund. In general terms, RKD
identifies the causal effect of a particular policy variable on an outcome variable by using
“kinks”—discontinuities in slope—in the assignment rule for the policy variable (Card, Lee, Pei,
and Weber, 2012). For example, one can test the effect of unemployment insurance benefits (the
policy variable) on the duration of joblessness (the outcome variable) based on the phase-out of
unemployment insurance benefits at higher income levels (the assignment variable) (Card, Lee,
Pei, and Weber, 2012). Another example would be to test the effect of the earned income tax
credit (the policy variable) on labor force participation (the outcome variable) based on the phaseout of the EITC at higher income levels (the assignment variable) (Jones, 2011).
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The intuition behind the strategy is that the causal effect of a policy can be estimated by testing
for a kink in the outcome variable that occurs at the kink in the assignment variable. RKD is a
similar concept to regression discontinuity design (RDD). RDD identifies an effect using a
discontinuity in the level of the function that relates an assignment variable to the outcome
variable. RKD identifies an effect using a discontinuity in slope of the function.
As with RDD, RKD has a “sharp” and “fuzzy” variant. In sharp RKD, the change in slope that
occurs at the kink point is precisely known and is equal for all affected entities. Fuzzy RKD, on
the other hand, uses an estimate of the average change in slope across agents based on the
observed data. In my setting, the estimated slope in the tax refund corresponds to the average
tax rate of firms, as discussed below. I implement a fuzzy RKD strategy, therefore, to account for
differences in average tax rates between firms and because I am only able to estimate firms’ tax
refunds based on taxes paid as reported in Compustat. In robustness tests, I present estimates
from a sharp RKD strategy as well.

12

1.3.2 Regression Kink Design Applied to the NOL Carryback Policy
In my empirical setting, the outcome variables of interest are firm uses of cash flow (e.g.,
investment, change in cash holdings, and change in debt) and measures of financial health (e.g.,
bankruptcy risk and credit ratings). The policy variable is the size of a firm’s tax refund. The
assignment variable that determines the value of a firm’s tax refund is a function of positive
taxable income (which I will call profits) in previous years and the size of losses in a given policy
year. Under the five-year carryback policy, a firm that incurs a loss in tax year 2001, for example,
can receive a refund for taxes paid from 1996 to 2000 until the point where total profits from those
years equals the 2001 loss. This statutory condition introduces a kink in cash available to a firm
from the tax refund at the point where losses in 2001 equal previous-years’ profits. (I detail the
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The marginal corporate tax rate is at least 34 percent for any firm with taxable income greater than $75,000 and is 35
percent for taxable income greater than $18 million. The average corporate tax rate (on positive taxable income) may be
expected to be close to 35 percent for most Compustat firms, therefore. My findings are similar assuming a constant tax
rate in a sharp RKD strategy (Table A1).
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construction of firms’ tax refunds and taxable income that can be applied to the policy in Appendix
1.)
As an example, take three firms that each sustained a $100 million loss in 2001. Firm A earned
$80 million in profits from 1996-2000, firm B earned $100 million in profits, and firm C earned
$120 million in profits. Under the five-year carryback policy, firm A would receive a $28 million tax
refund ($80*0.35, assuming a 35 percent tax rate), while both firms B and C would receive a $35
million tax refund. Although firm C had a higher level of profits from 1996-2000, firm C can only
receive a refund for taxes paid in previous years until the point where previous profits equal
current losses.
Figure 1 shows an example of the kink in the tax refund formula for a set of firms with $100
million in 2001 losses and varying amounts of profits from 1996 to 2000 (assuming a 35 percent
tax rate). The firm’s tax refund is a function of two variables: 1) profits over the five-year
carryback window, and 2) the firm’s policy-year losses. The kink point occurs where previousyears’ profits equal policy-year losses: at $100 million in this example. To the left of the kink, in
the region where past profits were less than current losses, the slope of the tax refund function is
the firm’s tax rate. For every extra dollar of past profits, a firm receives an extra $0.35 in tax
refund. To the right of the kink—the region where past profits exceed current losses—the slope of
the function is zero. A firm receives no additional refund for an additional dollar of past profits in
this region.
This example illustrates the tax refund function for firms with $100 million in losses. In my sample,
however, I have firms with a wide range of losses in the policy years. Each firm would receive its
maximum refund at the point where their policy-year losses equal their previous-years’ profits. To
standardize the tax refund function across firms, therefore, I generate one assignment variable to
describe the function: previous-years’ profits minus policy-year losses. The kink point in this
variable occurs at zero for all firms. As in Figure 1, when previous- years’ profits are less than
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policy-year losses, the slope of the function is the firm’s tax rate. When previous-years’ profits are
greater than policy-year losses, the slope is zero.
1.3.3 A General RKD Model
In this section, I describe the RKD methodology in detail. As in Nielsen, Sorensen and Taber
(2010), let the following model represent the general, causal relationship between an outcome
variable of interest (Y) and a policy variable of interest (X):
 =   +  + ,
In this model, X is a deterministic and continuous function of the assignment variable V and the
function relating X and V has a kink at V = V*. The outcome variable Y may be a direct function of
V as well— —and the error term

is a vector of unobservable random variables. In my

setting, Y is the firm outcome variable, X is the tax refund, and V is total profits over the five-year
carryback window minus policy-year losses. As discussed above, the kink occurs where previousyears’ profits equal policy-year losses (V*=0).
The typical problem in evaluating a model like the one above is that the error term

is correlated

with X, leading to bias in estimates of  . In RKD, however, if and  | have no kink in V at
V*—i.e., they have derivatives that are continuous in V at V = V*—then the parameter of interest
 identifies the causal effect of X on Y and is equal to the following term:
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The expression on the right hand side of the equation is the change in the slope of the conditional
expectation of Y given the assignment variable V at the kink point, divided by the change in the
slope of the deterministic function that relates X and V at the kink point. The policy’s effect is
identified by estimating the kink in the outcome variable with respect to the assignment variable
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and then making an adjustment for the magnitude of the kink in the policy variable with respect to
the assignment variable.
Card, Lee, Pei, and Weber (2012) show that under two major identifying assumptions, expression
(A) can recover the treatment on the treated parameter in a generalized non-separable model as
well:
 = , , ,
where Y is the outcome variable, X is the policy variable of interest, V is the assignment variable
that enters the model with a “kink” at V*, and W is an unobservable, non-additive error term.
The first identification assumption in Card et al. (2012) is that the probability density function of
firms is continuously differentiable in V—i.e., the density is smooth around the kink point. In short,
all firms cannot be able to perfectly choose the level of current losses relative to past profits that
they can apply to the tax refund policy. It is worth noting that this identification assumption does
not require that firms could in no way manipulate their tax refund position. Indeed, firms have
incentives to do extensive tax planning (Armstrong, Blouin, and Larker, 2012). Instead, the
identification assumption requires that there is sufficient randomness such that firms cannot
perfectly sort themselves on either side of the kink point. During recessionary periods, firms face
unanticipated negative shocks; it may be expected that they would have less room to maneuver
their tax position in these periods.
The second assumption is that pre-determined firm characteristics are continuously differentiable
with respect to V around the kink point. In other words, firms must be similar in other respects
around the kink point so as to be comparable. If firms have a kink in characteristics on either side
of the kink point, these other characteristics may be driving the result, rather than the policy
variable of interest driving the result. I provide evidence that suggests both assumptions are
satisfied in my setting in Section 1.3.6.
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1.3.4 RKD Empirical Specification
To estimate a fuzzy RKD, I use a two-stage least squares instrumental variable (IV) strategy
(Card, Lee, Pei, and Weber, 2012). In the first stage, I estimate the change in slope of the policy
variable—the tax refund—at the kink point where previous-years’ profits equal policy-year losses.
The variable that estimates this change in slope is an excluded instrument in the IV strategy. In
the second stage, I use the fitted values of the tax refund to estimate the effect of the tax refund
on firm outcomes. I describe each stage below:
First-Stage Regression:
The empirical specification for the first-stage regression is as follows:
1

!"#$%&'( = )* + ∑<-=,)- '(. −  ∗ - + γ- 0 · '(. −  ∗ - 2 + 345&67589'( + :; +

'( ,

where i is firm, t is year, and n is industry. V is the assignment variable (previous-years’ profits
minus policy-year losses) and V* is zero. I use the level of V (in millions of dollars) in the
regression as opposed to scaling V by assets or another measure because the policy kink occurs
in the level of the tax refund and V. In the context of Figure 1, the function relating V and the tax
refund is linear in the level of V to the left of the kink point. This function is not linear in V as a
share of assets or in a re-centered logarithm of V.
The instruments for Tax Refund are a dummy variable that equals one if previous-years’ profits
were less than policy losses (D) interacted with a polynomial in V. In the context of Figure 1
above, D is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is to the left of the kink point. The
coefficient > in this specification recovers the change in the slope of the tax refund value with
respect to V around the kink point (the denominator from the estimand in expression A). In my
setting, this value is equal to the average estimated tax rate.
Under the identification assumptions of regression kink design, the instruments satisfy the
assumptions required for a valid IV strategy. In my setting, the instruments satisfy the relevance
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condition because location relative to the kink point strongly affects the size of a tax refund, as
illustrated above. The exclusion condition—that being on one side of the kink point or the other
does not affect firm outcomes through another channel besides the size of the tax refund—also
appears reasonable. The kink point is a statutory requirement and one of the model identification
assumptions is that pre-determined firm characteristics have a smooth distribution around the
kink point. (This assumption appears to be satisfied in my setting as I show below.) Because firm
characteristics are similar around the kink and evolve smoothly, but the kink point is a sharp
discontinuity set in law, it is reasonable that being above or below the kink has no effect on firm
outcomes except through the formula that determines the tax refund.
My preferred polynomial order is P = 2, in line with other RKD studies, and I present robustness
to other polynomial orders in Table A2. I include the following controls in the regression: pretreatment values of Tobin’s q, return on assets, cash flow/assets, sales/assets, leverage, the
firm’s marginal tax rate, the log of assets and a quadratic in the value of losses that can be
applied to the policy. I include Fama-French 48 industry fixed effects to account for
macroeconomic shocks that affect industries differently and cluster the standard errors at the
Fama-French 48 industry level to account for unobserved correlation in errors within industries.
Second-Stage Regression:
The empirical specification for the second-stage regression is as follows:
<
∗ F
2 @A7BC%6D5B$'( = E* +  !"#$%&
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F
where i is firm, t is year, n is industry. !"#$%&
is the fitted values from the first-stage
regression and V is the assignment variable as described above. I include the same controls as in
(1) and I cluster the standard errors at the Fama-French 48 industry level.
I study two types of outcome variables of interest: potential uses of the tax refunds (i.e.,
investment, payout and the change in cash holdings) and measures of firm financial conditions
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including bankruptcy risk and credit conditions (Altman’s z-score, Ohlson’s o-score, distance-todefault, S&P credit rating upgrades and downgrades, and actual bankruptcy or liquidation). For
analyzing the potential uses of funds variables, I use the level of spending, in millions of dollars. I
use levels because the kink in the tax refund formula occurs in the level of V, and I would expect
the corresponding kink to occur in the level of the potential uses of funds. Measuring these
variables in levels also results in a convenient interpretation of  as a firm’s marginal propensity
to invest or otherwise allocate the funds out of every additional dollar of the tax refund.
Finally, I study the effects of the 2002 policy and the 2009 policy separately. The time dimension
of the above regressions varies depending on the policy period. For the 2002 policy, firms
received refunds in 2002 and in 2003 for losses incurred in 2001 and 2002, respectively. I
regress firm outcomes in 2002 and 2003 as a function of the tax refunds received in those years
and the assignment variable V in the previous year. This is a two-year panel regression. For the
2009 policy, most firms received only one refund—in 2010—for losses in 2008 or 2009. For the
empirical specification of the 2009 policy period, I regress firm outcomes in 2010 (or 2011) on the
value of the tax refund received in 2010 and the assignment variable V at the end of 2009. This is
a one-year, cross-sectional regression.
1.3.5 Data Description
In this analysis, I use financial variables from Compustat and CRSP as well as data on S&P credit
ratings from Capital IQ, analyst forecast dispersion from I/B/E/S, and marginal tax rates provided
by John Graham (Graham, 1996).
The crux of the analysis relies on calculating the firm tax refund and generating the assignment
variable V—profits (positive taxable income) available to apply to the policy from the five-year
carryback window minus total losses (negative taxable income) to apply to the policy. As taxable
income is not available on firm financial statements, I calculate an estimate of taxable income
based on Compustat data in a manner similar to Graham and Kim (2009). The difference

18

between my measure of taxable income and the Graham and Kim measure is that I calculate a
U.S.-specific measure because a firm’s tax refund under the policy is based only on U.S. taxable
income and taxes paid. The Graham and Kim (2009) measure is based on worldwide pre-tax
income. I then calculate total profits and total losses that can be applied to a carryback for a given
policy year, as well as the firm’s tax refund following Graham and Kim (2009) and Boynton and
Cooper (2003). These calculations are detailed in Appendix 1.
Following Graham and Kim (2009), I require that firms in my data sample: 1) experience a loss
that can be applied to the policy, 2) are present in Compustat for the five-year window required to
calculate the carryback value, 3) and have total assets of greater than $1 million. To remove the
influence of extreme outliers, I exclude firms in the 1 percent tails of V, the 1 percent tails of
investment (for variables measuring potential uses of the tax refund), and a few extreme outlier
points.
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Table 1 shows summary statistics for the outcome and control variables for all firm-years in the
sample. Appendix 2 presents details on the construction of each variable.
1.3.6 Empirical Strategy Validity
I present evidence that the RKD identification assumptions hold in Figure 2, Figure 3, and Table
1. Regarding the first assumption, Figure 2 shows a histogram of firms around the V = 0 kink
point in $0.25 million bins of the assignment variable V for both the 2002 policy period and the
2009 policy period. Though the distributions are somewhat noisy—particularly in the 2009
period—there is no obvious discontinuity around the kink point.
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For example, in the 2002 policy period sample, I observe one firm (Lucent Technologies) with an estimated tax refund
of $2.5 billion, whereas the second largest estimated tax refund is $1.1 billion. I calculate an average federal tax rate of
50.5 percent for Lucent Technologies from 1996-2000 and in 2000, the estimated rate is particularly unrealistic (92
percent), suggesting my methodology has overestimated this refund. I exclude this firm from the sample, therefore.
14
As further evidence that firms could not perfectly manipulate their value of V, Figure A3 in Appendix 3 shows the
histogram of V around the kink point separately for firms as of 2001 and as of 2002. The policy applied to losses for 2001
and 2002, so firms received separate tax refunds in 2002 and in 2003. As the carryback policy was passed into law in
March 2002, the refund based on 2002 losses would have been anticipated early in the year but the refund based on
2001 losses would have been more uncertain. If firms were able to perfectly manipulate their levels of V, I would expect to
see a discontinuity in the distribution V for the 2002 policy period, but that does not appear to be the case.
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Regarding the second assumption—that pre-determined firm characteristics have a smooth
distribution around the kink point—Figure 3 shows the average value of a number of pretreatment firm characteristics for firms in $1 million bins above and below the zero kink point for
the 2009 policy data set: leverage, Tobin’s q, return on assets, and the book value of total assets.
While again the distributions of these variables are noisy, they appear to evolve fairly smoothly
around the kink point. I test for a kink in characteristics more formally by collapsing the data into
$0.5 million bins and estimating the following specification in a narrow window around the kink
point (-$25 million to $25 million) for both the 2002 and 2009 policy periods as in Turner (2014):
3 '(. = E* + E '(. −  ∗  +  0 · '(. −  ∗  +
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In this specification, Y is the re-centered residual from a regression of a firm characteristic on
industry fixed effects (to control for industry-specific effects). The coefficient  recovers the
change in slope around the kink point. A statistically significant coefficient would suggest a kink in
the characteristic, but I find no evidence of this in either policy period (Table 3).
Another issue of concern for the validity of my results is any potential confounding interaction of
other firm-related fiscal policy measures that were enacted around the NOL carryback extension.
One major policy enacted in both 2002 and 2009 was “bonus” depreciation, which accelerated
the schedule for deducting investment expenses from taxable income. Because investment is
deductible from taxable income, this policy would be a concern for my identification strategy if it
caused certain types of firms to accelerate investment and increase losses such that firm
characteristics differed from one side of the kink point to the other.
Two factors suggest that bonus depreciation is not confounding my results. First, Mahon and
Zwick (2014) find the policy only raised investment for profitable firms, and had no effects on
investment for firms with losses. Since my sample is restricted to firms with losses, this result
suggests that the bonus depreciation policy is not confounding my results. Second, I test if firms
that are more likely to take advantage of bonus depreciation sort deterministically to one side of
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the kink point or the other. Mahon and Zwick (2014) show that bonus depreciation would be more
beneficial to firms in industries that invest in long-lived assets than invest in short-lived assets. If
bonus depreciation was causing predominately long-duration asset firms to increase investment
(and hence, increase their losses) and deterministically sort to one side of the kink point, I would
expect to see evidence of such sorting in the distribution of these firms. Appendix 3, Figure A3
shows histograms of V for firms with the highest value of the depreciation allowance (the longduration asset firms) compared to firms with the lowest value of the deprecation allowance (the
15

short-duration asset firms).

The distribution of firms looks relatively smooth around the kink

point in both cases.
Other potential confounding tax policy measures are the dividend tax cut of 2003, the tax
repatriation holiday on foreign earnings passed in 2004, and the extension of expiring tax
provisions passed in 2002. However, none of these policies would have been expected to cause
a discontinuity in firm characteristics around the kink point in the NOL tax refund function. The
kink point remains a statutory requirement that is unrelated to these other policies. The dividend
tax cut passed in 2003 reduced the top tax rate on U.S. dividend income from 38.6 percent to 15
percent. Yagan (2013) studies the effect of this tax cut on firm investment, and finds no differential
effects by firm size or other firm characteristics. The repatriation holiday affected repatriations in
2005—outside of my analysis window. Finally, the 2002 NOL policy was passed concurrently with
extensions of expiring tax provisions including the research and experimentation (R&E) tax credit,
a credit for the production of electricity from wind, and the work opportunity tax credit. These
provisions are widely expected to be extended each year. For example, the R&E tax credit was
originally passed in 1981 and has been extended 15 times.
15
Following Mahon and Zwick (2014), I separate firms into the ten most common three-digit NAICS industries in the top
three deciles of the present discounted value of a dollar of deductions for investment—firms that benefit the most from
bonus depreciation—and the ten most common industries in the bottom three deciles. In the top three deciles are:
professional, scientific and technical services (541), specialty trade contractors (238), computer and electronic product
manufacturing (334), durable goods wholesalers (423), construction of buildings (236), heavy and civil engineering
construction and land subdivision (237), truck transportation (484), rental and leasing services (532), nondepository credit
intermediation (522), and administrative and support service (561). In the bottom three deciles are: motor vehicle and
parts dealers (441), food manufacturing (311), real estate (531), telecommunications (517), fabricated metal product
manufacturing (332), food services and drinking places (722), transportation equipment manufacturing (336), oil and gas
extraction (211), nondurable goods wholesalers (424), and primary metal manufacturing (331).
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1.4 Background on Economic Conditions: 2002 vs. 2009 Policy Period
While the tax refund policies enacted in 2002 and 2009 were similar, economic conditions across
the two recessions and recovery periods were quite different. To give context to the policy
analysis, I offer some brief background on the two periods in Figure 4. There are three main
takeaways. First, economic conditions and perceptions about future economic conditions were
much weaker in the 2007-2009 recession than in the 2001 recession. Real GDP declines during
the 2007-2009 recession were the largest since the Great Depression. In contrast, there were
only two mild quarterly declines in the 2001 recession (Figure 4.A). Furthermore, CFO optimism
about future economic performance was lower during the 2009 post-recession period in than the
2001 post-recession period, as were professional forecaster’s expectations about future GDP
growth (Figure 4.B).
The second takeaway is that credit conditions were much worse during the 2007-2009 recession
than the 2001 recession, but conditions were tight in both recovery periods. Figure 4.C shows
that the Baa-Aaa corporate bond spread and the TED spread (the 3-month LIBOR minus the 3month Treasury bill rate—a measure of interbank lending conditions) spiked in 2008 and 2009.
The Baa-Aaa spread remained elevated in both recoveries, however, and the net percentage of
domestic banks reporting tighter lending standards for commercial and industrial (C&I) loans was
elevated longer in the 2001 recovery period than the 2007-2009 recovery period (Figure 4.D).
The third takeaway is that measures of uncertainty about future economic conditions were higher
in the 2007-2009 recession than the 2001 recession and economic policy uncertainty was higher
in the 2007-2009 recovery period. Stock volatility as measured by the VIX hit record levels in the
2007-2009 recession (Figure 4.E), though after the recession, the VIX fell to levels that followed
the 2001 recession. Dispersion in professional forecaster’s future expectations of growth was
also particularly high in the 2007-2009 recession, though it fell following the recession. Economic
policy uncertainty, on the other hand, as measured by the Baker, Bloom, and Davis index,
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remained substantially elevated in the 2007-2009 recovery period as compared to the 2001
recovery period (Figure 4.F).

1.5 Firm Responses to the NOL Carryback Extension Policy
1.5.1 First-Stage Estimates of the Tax Refund Rate
I begin by presenting results from the first-stage regression (specification 1) that estimates the
change in slope of the tax refund function around the kink point. As discussed above, this change
should recover the average firm tax rate in the two carryback window periods. Table 4 shows the
average tax rate estimates for both the 2002 policy and the 2009 policy: 34 percent and 31
percent, respectively. These coefficient estimates are not statistically different and are in a
16

reasonable range for average statutory corporate income tax rate estimates.

Observing a

reasonable tax rate, as I do, is an important test for the validity of my empirical strategy.
1.5.2 2002 Policy Period Tax Refund Allocation
I next study how firms allocate their refund dollars. I look at each policy period separately so as
not to assume that firms would have taken the same actions across the two periods. Table 5
shows the effect of the tax refund on potential uses of funds for the 2002 policy period (empirical
specification 2). Panel A shows the effect on the major uses of funds on a firm’s cash flow
statement: investment, change in cash, change in total debt, payout, and other potential uses
(acquisitions, short-term financial investment and long-term financial investment). Column 6 of
Table 5 shows the tax refund’s estimated effect on the total of these potential uses. The estimated
coefficient in each of these regressions is interpreted as the marginal propensity of a firm to
invest or use the funds otherwise out of each additional dollar of tax refund. Column 7 shows the
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The highest corporate marginal tax rate in the United States is 35 percent, which phases in at taxable income of $18.3
million. Any taxable income above $75,000 is subject to a tax rate of at least 34 percent. The tax rate I estimate is the
average rate paid on positive taxable income, not the average effective tax rate across firms. The average effective U.S.
corporate tax rate is lower, because it averages firms that pay few taxes due to sustaining losses or due to having NOL
carryforwards available to offset taxable profits. From 1996-2000, for example, total U.S. corporate tax receipts as a
percentage of domestic economics profits averaged 25.9 percent. From 2003-2007, total U.S. corporate tax receipts as a
percentage of domestic economics profits averaged 22.4 percent (CBO, 2014).
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effect on the change in employment. The coefficient in this regression is interpreted as the
change in the number of employees (in thousands) for each million dollars of tax refund received.
I find that in the 2002 policy period, firms allocated $0.40 of each refund dollar to investment in
the year they received the tax refund (2002 and 2003). I cannot identify a statistically significant
average use of the rest of the funds and I find no effect of the refund on firm hiring. I find that the
regression estimates across the major uses of funds sum to a point estimate of 1.09, indicating
that $1.09 of each $1 of tax refund was allocated to one of these uses. This estimate is relatively
close to $1 of total uses, and shows that the empirical specification is capturing the uses of the
tax refund reasonably well. In the years following receipt, I do not find any effects for the 2002
policy period (Appendix 3, Table A5).
Next, I study whether financial constraints and investment opportunities affected firms’ responses
to the tax refund policy. If firms were financially unconstrained, the tax refunds should have little
effect on investment. As canonical theories in finance show, in a frictionless environment, a firm
with attractive investment projects could receive necessary funding from capital markets. The
result from the 2002 policy period is consistent with the hypothesis that, at the time, firms had
profitable investment opportunities, but were financially constrained. When the five-year
carryback policy lifted constraints, firms invested the funds. To test this hypothesis, I examine
whether the investment increase was concentrated in financially constrained firms and whether it
was concentrated in firms with better investment opportunities.
I separate firms into subsamples of financially constrained firms and unconstrained firms (and
likewise into firms with high and low investment opportunities) and I compare the effects of tax
refund receipt on investment between subsamples. I use three measures of financial constraints.
First, I sort firms in the sample by the level of the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index of financial
constraints, and classify a firm as financially constrained if the firm falls in the top quartile of the
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distribution.

17

Second, I classify firms as constrained if they do not pay dividends or repurchase

stock. Third, I use a Dharmapala, Foley and Forbes (2011) measure and define a firm as
financially constrained if total payout to operating income is less than or equal to zero. All
measures are calculated using lagged values of the firm characteristic.
To test whether the increase in capital expenditures was concentrated in firms with high
investment opportunities, I classify a firm as having high investment opportunities in three ways:
1) if the firm falls in the top quartile of the distribution of lagged Tobin’s q, 2) if the tax refund was
received in 2003 (rather than 2002), and 3) if the firm is a “multinational” firm, defined as having a
substantial share of foreign activity (foreign pre-tax income of more than 5 percent of total pre-tax
income in absolute value as in Graham and Mills, 2008). By 2003, the economic recovery was
gaining speed; it is therefore likely that firm investment opportunities were better in 2003 than in
2002. Multinational firms are also likely to have a larger investment opportunity set than domestic
firms. I classify low investment opportunity firms, therefore, as: 1) those in the bottom quartile of
Tobin’s q, 2) as having received the refund in 2002, and 3) as having primarily domestic activity
(foreign pre-tax income less than or equal to 5 percent of total pre-tax income in absolute value).
I present results for the effect of tax refund receipt on firm investment for financially constrained
and unconstrained firms in Table 6, Panel A. As hypothesized, the investment result from the
2002 policy period is concentrated in financially constrained firms. I estimate that these firms
spent between $1.00 and $1.09 of each $1 of tax refund on investment. I see no statistically
significant effect of the policy on the investment of unconstrained firms.
I also find evidence that investment spending out of the tax refund was concentrated in firms with
higher investment opportunities (Table 6, Panel B): high Tobin’s q firms ($1.02 of each tax refund
dollar, column 1), in 2003 ($0.75 of each tax refund dollar, column 4), and in multinational firms
($0.68 of each tax refund dollar, column 5). I find no statistically significant effect of tax refund
17

Using the Compustat variable names, this index is defined as: -1.002*(IB + DP)/PPENTt-1 + 0.283*(AT +
PRCC_C*CSHO – CEQ − TXDB)/AT + 3.139*(DLTT + DLC)/(DLTT + SEQ) − 39.368*((DVC + DVP)/PPENTt-1) −
1.315*(CHE / PPENTt-1)
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receipt on investment in low Tobin’s q firms, in 2002, or domestic firms (Columns 2, 3 and 6,
respectively). Note that investment reported in Compustat is a worldwide measure of investment.
Given that the investment response was concentrated in multinational firms, I cannot say for
certain whether investment resulting from the refund policy was carried out in the United States
as policymakers intended or whether firms transferred the tax refunds to invest overseas.

18

My

results represent an upper bound of the effect on domestic investment.
1.5.3 2009 Policy Period Tax Refund Allocation
In the 2009 policy period, I find that firms chose different uses of funds. In the year firms received
the refund (2010), they allocated $0.96 to higher cash holdings for every dollar of tax refund on
average (Table 7, column 2). The regression estimates across all uses of the funds sum to a point
estimate of 1.3 in this year, again suggesting that the specification is doing a reasonable job
allocating $1 of tax refund. Notably, I find no effect on firm investment in this period—even for
financially constrained firms or firms with higher investment opportunities (Table A6)—and again,
no effect on firm hiring. The cash effect is only marginally significant, however, with a p-value of
0.096. Note that because most firms receive just one tax refund in the 2009 period, the sample
size in this period is much smaller than in the first policy period. The regression kink design is a
relatively low power methodology (Card, Lee, Pei, and Weber, 2012) and a number of my
regressions for the 2009 period appear to suffer from low power.
I find that in the year after receiving the refund (2011), firms reduced cash holdings and used the
funds to pay down long-term debt. Firms reduced cash holdings by $1.54 per dollar of tax refund
in 2011 and reduced long-term debt in 2011 by $1.26 of every tax refund dollar (Table 8, Panel A).
I find no effects of the tax refunds in any following year. While these point estimates appear
slightly high (they imply that for each dollar of tax refund, firms pay down more than a dollar in
debt), the estimates are not statistically different from the cash increase estimate in Table 7 or
18

Firms report investment by geographic segment (domestic and non-domestic) in the Compustat Segments database,
but the coverage appears poor in my sample. Of the 891 firm-years in the sample that report substantial foreign activity in
this period, only 100 firms report foreign capital expenditures.
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from $1. Panel B of Table 8 shows results for the uses of the tax refunds over 2010 and 2011 in
total. I find no average change in cash over the two years, consistent with firms first increasing
and then paying down cash. The average effect over the two years was that firms paid down
long-term debt in those years—$1.36 of an additional tax refund dollar was allocated to debt
reduction (significant at the 5 percent level).
Why did firms increase cash in the 2009 period? Theory points to two main hypotheses for the
savings response: 1) holding cash due to higher idiosyncratic risk or uncertainty about future
prospects in order to insulate the firm from future negative shocks (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
Williamson, 1999), and 2) holding cash when facing financing constraints in order to fund future
investment opportunities (Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Han and Qui, 2007). To test
these hypotheses, I divide firms into subsamples based on proxies for high and low uncertainty
about future prospects and I divide firms into samples based on measures of high and low
financial constraints.
For the uncertainty test, I generate three proxies for uncertainty about future cash flows or
performance by industry, following measures used in the literature: historical cash flow volatility,
stock volatility and analyst forecast dispersion. The first proxy is historical cash flow volatility,
constructed in the vein of Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). I calculate the Fama-French 48 industry
average of the 10-year standard deviation in firm cash flow/assets. For the stock return volatility
measure, I calculate the industry average of the standard deviation of firm weekly stock returns
over the past calendar year. For the analyst forecast dispersion proxy, I calculate the industry
average of the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts for the year forward (scaled by
the prior year-end stock price). For each of these three measures, I classify firms in the top
quartile of industry volatility or dispersion as the “high uncertainty” sample and firms in the bottom
quartile as the “low uncertainty” sample. The stock volatility proxy and analyst forecast proxy are
in the vein of Zhang (2006), but I use industry-level measures for consistency with the Bates,
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Kahle and Stulz (2009) measure of cash-flow volatility.

For the financial constraints test, I use

the same measures of financial constraints as in Section 1.5.2 above.
I find that the cash holdings result is indeed concentrated in firms facing higher uncertainty as
measured by past cash flow volatility and stock market volatility (Table 9, Panel A). The estimate
for the cash change effect in the high cash flow volatility sample (column 1) is close to the point
estimate from the main specification (1.09 versus 0.96) and is significant at the 1 percent level.
The point estimate of the cash effect in the high stock volatility sample is somewhat high at 1.97
(column 3), though this estimate is not statistically different from a value of $1. (Given the small
size of these subsamples, additional noise may be expected.) For the subsample split by analyst
forecast dispersion, there is no statistically significant effect on the change in cash for firms in
either subsample, though the point estimate of the effect suggests that the cash effect is larger in
the sample with higher analyst forecast dispersion (column 5).
Turning to the financial constraints hypothesis, I find no evidence that suggests the change in
cash is concentrated in the most financially constrained firms. I see no statistically significant
increase in cash in either the “high” or “low” financial constraint subsamples (Table 9, Panel B),
suggesting that high financial constraints are not the primary motivation for firms holding the tax
refunds as cash in 2010. I cannot rule out the fact that these may be poor measures of financial
constraints in this period, however, given the tightness of credit conditions overall in the 20072009 recession, or that these may be poor measures of whether a firm expects to be financially
constrained in the future.
1.5.4 Did Tax Refunds Improve Firm Financial Conditions?
Next, I examine how the tax refunds affected firm financial conditions. Another stated policy goal
of the five-year tax carryback extension was helping firms “weather the storm.” I study six
measures of firm financial conditions: three bankruptcy risk measures (Altman’s z-score, Ohlson’s
o-score, and distance to default), two credit risk measures (the probabilities of a future S&P credit
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rating upgrade or downgrade), and the probability of a future bankruptcy or liquidation. I describe
these measures in Appendix 2.
Table 10 shows results for the bankruptcy risk and credit rating measures for the 2002 policy
period (Panel A) and the 2009 policy period (Panel B). To provide economic magnitudes for the
results, I present standardized coefficients that are interpreted as the standard deviation change
in the outcome variable resulting from a one standard deviation change in the tax refund.
For the 2002 policy period, I see a small effect on bankruptcy risk: a statistically significant
increase in Altman’s z-score, which indicates a reduction in bankruptcy risk for a firm. A one
standard deviation increase in a firm’s tax refund results in about a tenth of a standard deviation
increase in z-score on average in this sample. I see no statistically significant effect of the tax
refunds on any of the other measures of bankruptcy risk or on firm credit ratings in this period,
however.
I see larger effects for the 2009 policy period. A one standard deviation increase in the tax refund
results in a 0.18 standard deviation increase in Altman’s z-score, a smaller change in Ohlson’s oscore (-0.05 standard deviation—note, a decrease in o-score indicates a reduction in bankruptcy
risk), and about a fifth of a standard deviation decrease in distance to default one year and two
years forward. Looking at the effect of the policy on a firm’s credit risk, I see that it resulted in a
statistically significant reduction in the probability of a credit rating downgrade. A one standard
deviation increase in a firm’s tax refund resulted in about a fifth of a standard deviation decrease
in the probability of a credit rating downgrade over the next 24 months or 36 months. These
findings are consistent with the results on the allocation of tax funds in the 2009 policy period:
that firms held the tax refunds as cash first, and then reduced cash in order to pay down longterm debt. These financial decisions would tend to reduce firm riskiness overall and the riskiness
of firm debt positions, in particular.
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Finally, I look at whether a receiving a tax refund lowered the probability of a firm experiencing
bankruptcy or liquidation (Table 11). I see no statistically significant effect, suggesting that while
the tax refunds helped improve broad financial conditions in 2009, they did not stave off severe
negative outcomes for firms. The incidence of bankruptcy in the sample is quite low overall,
however, with only a few firms leaving the sample for this reason in the years after the policies
were enacted.
1.5.5 Robustness
I carry out several robustness tests and show that my results are generally robust to the empirical
specification and sample used, though the investment result for the 2002 policy period is more
robust than the cash and debt results for the 2009 policy period. First, I conduct a “sharp RKD”
test of the kink in the outcome variables. Second, I vary the order of the polynomial in V. Third, I
narrow the bandwidth of the regression window. Fourth, I exclude industries that were particularly
hard hit in each recession (telecommunications and airlines in 2002 and homebuilders in 2009). I
present the results in Appendix 3.
I show results from a sharp RKD test of the main results in Table A1. From the 2002 policy period,
I show the increase in investment (column 1) and in the 2009 policy period, I show the following
results: the increase in cash in 2010 (column 2), the reductions in cash and long-term debt in
2011 (columns 3 and 4) and the two-year cumulative reduction in long-term debt in 2010 and
2011 (column 5). The sharp RKD strategy is estimated under empirical specification 1. As in the
first-stage regression of the tax refund, the coefficient γ recovers the change in slope of the
outcome variable around the kink point. In the sharp RKD strategy, one estimates the change in
slope of the outcome variable of interest (e.g., investment) with respect to the assignment
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variable (V), and then divides by the change in slope of the policy variable (the average firm tax
rate).

19

Assuming a tax rate of 35 percent for all firms, the “sharp RKD” results are quite similar to the
“fuzzy RKD” results for each of the variables. For example, the estimated change in the slope of
investment in the 2002 period is 0.145, which corresponds to an estimate of $0.41 per dollar of
the tax refund spent on investment (0.145/0.35); this result is quite close to the fuzzy RKD
estimate of $0.40 in the baseline specification. In the first year of the 2009 period, the estimated
slope change of the change in cash in the 2009 period is 0.31, which corresponds to an estimate
of $0.88 allocated to higher cash; this result is again quite close to the fuzzy RKD estimate of
$0.96. While the change in cash in 2010 is only marginally significant (p-value of 0.11), the other
estimates are significant at the 5 percent level.
Table A2 shows results from tests that vary the polynomial order for the first-stage regression and
the second-stage regression. I test 1) including only a linear interaction term with D, and 2)
including the full polynomial interaction with D in the first-stage regression. I then test both firststage options using a second-order and third-order polynomial in V in the second-stage
regression. I report results for the same results as in the sharp RKD test. Each panel in the table
reflects a separate regression. Each row shows results for a separate dependent variable and
each column shows results for a different polynomial order.
My preferred regression specification uses a second-order polynomial in V with the second-order
polynomial interacted with D also included in the first-stage excluded instrument. For the
investment result, the estimated coefficient is fairly stable over a second- and third-order
polynomial in V in the second stage. It is also stable using a linear polynomial term in the first19

This corresponds to the RKD estimand from expression A. The intuition for this calculation is that empirical specification
(1) estimates the additional funds spent for each additional dollar of previous-years’ profits on the left side of the kink
point. The coefficient estimate in Table A1 suggests that firms spent an additional $0.145 on investment for each $1 of
previous-years’ profits in the 2002 period. But for each additional dollar of previous-years’ profits, the firm did not receive
an extra dollar of tax refund—the firm only received an extra $0.35 of tax refund (if the tax rate was $0.35). So the effect
of the policy is that the firm spent $0.145 out of the $0.35 it received—$0.145/$0.35 or $0.41 in total.
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stage regression for both second-stage polynomial choices. Estimates range from $0.39 cents
per tax refund dollar spent on investment to $0.47 per tax refund dollar. For the 2009 policy
period, the regression coefficient on the cash reduction in the second year (2011) is also fairly
stable over all specifications. For the other outcome variables, most regression coefficients are
also in the general range of the preferred estimate. The majority of results remain statistically
significant, though the 2010 cash change result in column 3 loses significance in the nonpreferred specifications. In addition, specifications in column 2 (a linear term in the first stage and
a second-order polynomial in the second stage) also lose significance. Including a second- or
third-order polynomial interaction term in the first-stage regression appears reasonable as there
may be unmeasured effects from only using a linear term. A linear term may not capture the tax
refund function well for larger firms that are subject to the corporate Alternative Minimum Tax or
have different uses of tax credits, for example.
Next, I test narrowing the regression bandwidth (Table A3). In the preferred specification, I use
the full sample because the regression kink design is a relatively low power methodology (Card,
Lee, Pei, and Weber, 2012). For the 2002 period, the estimated coefficient in the investment
regression increases when narrowing the window (although not monotonically) and retains
statistical significance for most specifications. Narrowing the bandwidth of the regression for the
2009 policy period, which reduces the sample size significantly, I see that the regression
coefficients are not nearly as stable and I lose statistical significance in many windows. This
result is consistent with Card, Lee, Pei, and Weber’s result that RKD estimates tend to become
noisy and lose power at lower bandwidths.
Finally, I exclude from the regression sample industries that experienced particularly large losses
during the two recessions: telecom and airlines in 2002 and homebuilding in 2009 (Table A4). For
the 2002 sample, I find that excluding these industries, firms increased investment by $0.51 for
every dollar of tax refund. This estimate is similar to the full-sample estimate ($0.40) but slightly
bigger, which is sensible because the excluded industries likely had poorer investment
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opportunities at the time and would have been less likely to use the funds for investment. For the
2009 period, I find that the coefficient estimates on the changes in cash (columns 2 and 3) remain
largely the same ($1.04 for every refund dollar versus a $0.96 baseline estimate in the first year
and -$1.48 versus -$1.54 in the second year) though the statistical significance becomes
marginal as the sample size declines. The estimates on the debt reductions in columns 4 and 5
are also of similar magnitudes as the baseline estimates and are statistically significant at the 5
percent level.

1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I show that firm responses to a fiscal stimulus policy enacted in 2002 and in 2009
differed across the two periods. The policy I study granted additional tax refunds to firms by
extending the carryback window for net operating losses. In the 2002 period, I find that firms used
the tax refunds to increase investment in the year they received the refund. In the 2009 period, in
contrast, I find that firms used the refunds to increase cash holdings in the year they received the
refund. In the following year, firms decreased their cash holdings and used the funds to pay down
long-term debt. I find that the tax refunds had an effect on improving firm financial conditions
broadly in the 2009 period as well, lowering bankruptcy risk and lowering the probability of a
credit rating downgrade, but I find fewer effects on financial health in 2002.
The contrasting results over the two periods are consistent with the hypothesis that firms may
choose different uses of liquidity under different economic conditions, as shown in dynamic
models of firm investment and financing policies such as Bolton, Chen and Wang (2011, 2013).
Comparing economic conditions across the policy periods, in the 2002 period, the economy was
recovering from a much milder recession. Growth prospects were higher and policy uncertainty
was lower, though credit conditions remained tight. My finding that investment was concentrated
in financially constrained firms and those with higher investment opportunities is consistent with
the hypothesis that a number of firms had profitable investment opportunities at the time but were
financially constrained. When the five-year carryback policy eased financial constraints in 2002
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and 2003, therefore, these firms took advantage of the tax refunds to boost investment. The 2009
cash holdings result, on the other hand, was concentrated in firms facing higher uncertainty. This
fact is consistent with a hypothesis that due to high economic uncertainty, an increase in cash
due to a precautionary savings motive was the highest value use of funds at the time.
This work should be informative to policymakers considering implementing the five-year NOL
carryback policy in the future. Is there evidence that the policy achieved the two goals of boosting
investment and improving firm financial conditions? Yes, but my results suggest that the policy
only achieved one of these goals in each period and I find no effect of the policy on
employment—another stated policy goal. In addition, I cannot say for certain whether the policy
boosted domestic investment in the 2002 period as policymakers desired. I measure an effect on
worldwide investment and it was multinational firms in my sample that increased investment, not
domestic firms. These firms may have transferred the funds overseas to invest.
This work also highlights the importance of policymakers carefully considering policy goals and
broad economic conditions in evaluating the potential effectiveness of firm fiscal stimulus actions.
If the main policy goal is to increase investment, for example, my results suggest that the
carryback policy is more likely to be effective during a period when firms appear financially
constrained but are not facing especially weak economic prospects or high levels of uncertainty.
My results suggest that the policy is less likely to be effective increasing investment during a
period of high uncertainty and when firms have weak investment opportunities. If the policy goal
is to improve firm financial conditions broadly, however, my results suggest the carryback policy
may indeed be effective during such times.

34

Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Example of Kink in the Tax Refund Formula
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Figure 2: Distribution of sample firms around the kink point (V=0)
2002 Policy

2009 Policy

Figure 3: Distribution of pre-treatment firm characteristics around
the kink point (V = 0) for the 2009 policy period
Leverage (ratio)

ROA (ratio)

Tobin’s q (ratio)

Total Assets ($millions)
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Figure 4: Economic Conditions: 2002 and 2009 Policy Period
(A) Real GDP Growth

(B) Economic Outlook

(C) Bank Lending Conditions

(D) Loan Spreads

(E) Stock Volatility

(F) Policy and Economic Uncertainty

Note: Gray shading represents recession periods
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Table 1: NOL Carryback Deduction Example

1996

1997

Tax Year
1998
1999

Before Carryback
Taxable income before carryback ($Mil) 50
Taxes Paid, τ=0.35 ($Mil)
17.5

40
14.0

30
10.5

2000

2001

20
7.0

10
3.5

-100
0

2-Year Carryback
NOL carryback deduction ($Mil)
Taxable income after carryback ($Mil)
Taxes Paid, τ=0.35 ($Mil)
Tax Refund ($Mil)

0
50
17.5

0
40
14.0

0
30
10.5

-20
0
0

-10
0
0

30
-70
0
10.5

5-Year Carryback
NOL carryback deduction ($Mil)
Taxable income after carryback ($Mil)
Taxes Paid, τ=0.35 ($Mil)
Tax Refund ($Mil)

-50
0
0

-40
0
0

-10
20
7.0

0
20
7.0

0
10
3.5

100
0
0
35
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Table 2: Data Sample Summary Statistics
2002 Policy
2009 Policy
Mean
Std. Dev
Mean
Std. Dev
V (Profits Minus Losses) ($M)
11.27
290.13
28.95
480.43
Tax Refund ($M)
8.84
44.70
12.51
50.70
Investment ($M)
28.72
97.35
50.20
146.77
Change in Cash ($M)
5.00
86.03
-2.10
171.99
Payout ($M)
7.37
45.90
18.66
94.95
Change in Debt ($M)
-11.04
198.70
-5.04
262.75
Change in Short-term Investments ($M) -0.30
64.76
5.14
85.35
Change in Long-term Investments ($M) 23.70
225.99
38.40
244.39
Change in Employment (Thousands)
-0.17
1.98
0.07
3.21
Altman's z-score
-1.99
10.10
-2.60
11.89
Ohlson's o-score
1.63
8.55
0.47
6.73
Bankruptcy or Liqudation, 1yrF
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.03
Bankruptcy or Liqudation, 2yrF
0.01
0.07
0.00
0.06
S&P Credit Downgrade, 1yrF
0.26
0.44
0.14
0.35
S&P Credit Downgrade, 2yrF
0.35
0.48
0.20
0.40
S&P Credit Downgrade, 3yrF
0.43
0.50
0.26
0.44
S&P Credit Upgrade, 1yrF
0.13
0.34
0.27
0.44
S&P Credit Upgrade, 2yrF
0.24
0.43
0.36
0.48
S&P Credit Upgrade, 3yrF
0.32
0.47
0.47
0.50
Distance-to-default, 1yr
0.11
0.23
0.03
0.12
Distance-to-default, 2yr
0.11
0.24
0.03
0.12
Lagged ROA
-0.07
0.33
-0.07
0.40
Lagged ln(Assets)
4.87
1.96
5.28
2.03
Lagged Tobin's q
4.07
82.34
3.16
6.68
Lagged Cash Flow/Assets
-0.18
0.55
-0.15
0.70
Lagged Sales/Assets
1.10
1.09
1.03
1.01
Lagged Leverage
0.31
0.31
0.25
0.27
Lagged Marginal Tax Rate
0.20
0.11
0.21
0.11
The table reports sumary statistics for outcome and control variables used in the analysis of the
2002 policy period (columns 1 and 2) and 2009 policy period (columns 3 and 4). Definitions of
each variable are given in Appendix 2.
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Table 4: First-stage Regression Estimates:
Average Firm Tax Rate
Dependent variable = Tax Refund
2002 Policy
(1)

2009 Policy
(2)

0.337***
[0.0356]

0.309***
[0.0514]

+
+

+
+

0.00

0.00

Change in Slope

Controls
Industry F.E.
F-test (p-value)
Chi-squared test
for coefficient differences (p-value)

0.71

Observations
R-squared

3,337
0.830

1,496
0.813

This table presents results from the first-stage regression, which estimates the
change in slope of the tax refund as a function of the assignment variable around the
kink point (the estimated coefficient γ1 from empirical specification 1). The change in
slope equals the estimated average tax rate across firms, as described in Section III.
Columns 1 and 2 report the estimated tax rate for the 2002 period and the 2009
period, respectively. Regressions include a second-order polynomial in the
assignment variable V, industry fixed effects at the Fama-French 48 level, and the pretreatment controls Tobin's q, ROA, cash flow/assets, sales/assets, leverage, the
marginal tax rate, ln(assets), and a quadratic in stimulus losses. Standard errors are
clustered at the Fama-French 48 industry level and are reported in brackets. ***, **,
and * indicate levels of 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance, respectively.

40

41
3,337
0.404

Observations
R-squared

+

0.073

3,337

+

0.050

3,337

+

+

[0.871]

-0.606

0.145

3,337

+

+

[0.130]

-0.0855

Payout
(4)

0.056

3,337

+

+

[0.579]

0.358

Other Uses
(5)

0.235

3,337

+

+

[0.786]

1.093

Total
(6)

0.066

3,232

+

+

[0.00711]

0.00271

Change in
Employment
(7)

This table presents results from the second-stage regression (the coefficient β1 from empirical specifiation 2) and estimates the effect of the tax refund on potential
uses of the funds in the 2002 policy period in the year that the firms received the tax refund. Each column presents results from one regression; the dependent
variable is listed at the top of each column. Other uses are acquistions, change in short-term investments and change in investments. Total is the sum of all uses
listed in columns 1 to 5. Regressions include a second-order polynomial in the assignment variable V, industry fixed effects at the Fama-French 48 level, and the
pre-treatment controls Tobin's q, ROA, cash flow/assets, sales/assets, leverage, the marginal tax rate, ln(assets), and a quadratic in stimulus losses. Standard
errors are clustered at the industry level and are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate levels of 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance, respectively.

+
+

[0.252]

[0.155]

Industry F.E.

-0.189

Change in Change in
Cash
Total Debt
(2)
(3)

0.403***

Controls

Tax Refund

Dependent variable = Investment
(1)

Table 5: Tax Refund Allocation in the 2002 Policy Period:
Year of Tax Refund Reciept

Table 6: Investment, Financial Constraints, and Investment Opportunities
Panel A: Financial Constraints
Dependent Variable = Investment
Financially Constrained?

Tax Refund

KZ Index
Yes
No
(1)
(2)

Payout
Yes
No
(3)
(4)

DFF
Yes
(5)

No
(6)

1.091*

0.0534

1.004*

0.418

1.002**

0.501

[0.659]

[0.228]

[0.535]

[0.307]

[0.509]

[0.389]

Controls

+

+

+

+

+

+

Industry F.E.

+

+

+

+

+

+

Observations
R-squared

785

787

2,196

1,141

2,501

816

0.571

0.544

0.413

0.453

0.402

0.465

Panel B: Investment Opportunities
Dependent Variable = Investment

High Investment Opportunities?

Tax Refund

Tobin's Q
High
Low
Yes
No
(1)
(2)
1.017*
[0.593]

-1.454
[1.481]

Year of Tax Refund
2002
2003
No
Yes
(3)
(4)
0.277
[0.384]

0.753***
[0.243]

Multinational Domestic
Yes
No
(5)
(6)
0.676*
[0.372]

0.171
[0.177]

Controls

+

+

+

+

+

+

Industry F.E.

+

+

+

+

+

+

Observations
R-squared

833
0.500

835
0.371

1727
0.395

1610
0.428

891
0.441

2434
0.419

This table presents results from the second-stage regression (the coefficient β1 from empirical specifiation 2) and estimates
the effect of the tax refund on investment in the 2002 policy period in subsamples of financially constrained and unconstrained
firms and firms with high and low investment opportunities . Panel A restricts the sample by three measures of firm financial
constraints. Columns 1 and 2 show results for subsamples of firms in the top and bottom quartiles of the Kaplan-Zingales
(1997) index, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 show results for subsamples of firms with zero and non-zero dividend issuance
and stock repurchases, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 show results for subsamples of firms for which total payouts to
operating income is and is not less than or equal to zero, respectively, as in Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011). Panel B
restricts the sample by three measures of firm investment opportunities. Columns 1 and 2 show results for subsamples of
firms in the top and bottom quartiles of Tobin's q, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 show results for tax refund receipt in 2002
and 2003, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 show results for firms with substantial foreign activity (foreign pre-tax income greater
than 5 percent of total pre-tax income in absolute value) and domestic firms, respectively. All financial constraint and
investment opportunity measures are calculated for the year prior to tax refund receipt. Regressions include a second-order
polynomial in the assignment variable V, industry fixed effects at the Fama-French 48 level, and the pre-treatment controls
Tobin's q, ROA, cash flow/assets, sales/assets, leverage, the marginal tax rate, ln(assets), and a quadratic in stimulus
losses. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate levels of 1
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance, respectively.
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+
1,496
0.395

Observations
R-squared

0.266

1,496

+

+

-0.472

0.171

1,496

+

+

[0.386]

0.215

1,496

+

+

[0.496]

0.313

Payout
(4)

0.143

1,496

+

+

[1.000]

-0.0257

Other Uses
(5)

0.328

1,496

+

+

[1.916]

1.312

Total
(6)

0.183

1,438

+

+

[0.00923]

-0.00481

Change in
Employment
(7)

This table presents results the second-stage regression (the coefficient β1 from empirical specifiation 2)and estimates the effect of the tax refund on
potential uses of the funds in the first year of tax refund receipt in the 2009 policy period. Other uses are acquistions, change in short-term
investments and change in investments. Total is the sum of all uses listed in columns 1 to 5. Regressions include a second-order polynomial in the
assignment variable V, industry fixed effects at the Fama-French 48 level, and the pre-treatment controls Tobin's q, ROA, cash flow/assets,
sales/assets, leverage, the marginal tax rate, ln(assets), and a quadratic in stimulus losses. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and
are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate levels of 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance, respectively.

+

Industry F.E.

0.958*
[0.576]

-0.406

Change in Change in
Cash
Total Debt
(2)
(3)

[0.380]
Controls

Tax Refund

Dependent variable = Investment
(1)

Table 7: Tax Refund Allocation in the 2009 Policy Period:
Year of Tax Refund Receipt

Table 8: Tax Refund Allocation in the 2009 Policy Period
Panel A: Year After Tax Refund Receipt (2011)
Change in Change in
LongShortChange in
Cash
Term Debt Term Debt Payout
Dependent variable = Investment
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Other
Uses
(6)

Total
(7)

Tax Refund

-0.632
[0.542]

-1.542*
[0.828]

-1.260**
[0.626]

0.0568
[0.534]

0.124
[0.680]

-0.0972
[1.545]

-0.943
[2.610]

Controls
Industry F.E.

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

Observations
R-squared

1,355
0.363

1,355
0.026

1,355
0.076

1,355
0.079

1,355
0.245

1,355
0.129

1,355
0.254

Other
Uses

Total

Panel B: Two-Year Total Effect After Tax Refund Receipt (2010 and 2011)
Change in Change in
LongShortChange in
Dependent variable = Investment
Cash
Term Debt Term Debt Payout
Tax Refund

-1.008
[0.887]

-0.524
[0.968]

-1.361**
[0.622]

-0.363
[0.477]

0.419
[1.174]

-0.317
[2.532]

0.295
[4.593]

Controls
Industry F.E.

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

Observations
R-squared

1,355
0.384

1,355
0.150

1,355
0.114

1,355
0.378

1,355
0.254

1,355
0.154

1,355
0.307

This table presents the coefficient β1 from empirical specifiation (2), the second-stage regression, and estimates the effect of the tax refund on
potential uses of the funds in the 2009 policy period. Panel A reports estimates for the year following tax refund receipt (2011) and Panel B
reports estimates for the cumulative use of funds over 2010 and 2011. Other uses are acquistions, change in short-term investments and change
in investments. Total is the sum of all uses listed in columns 1 to 6. Regressions include a second-order polynomial in the assignment variable
"V", industry fixed effects at the Fama-French 48 level, and the pre-treatment controls Tobin's q, ROA, cash flow/assets, sales/assets, leverage,
the marginal tax rate, ln(assets), and a quadratic in stimulus losses. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are reported in
brackets. ***, ** and * indicate levels of 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance, respectively
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Table 9: Change in Cash, Uncertainty, and Financial Constraints
Panel A: Uncertainty Proxies
Dependent Variable = Change in Cash
Cash Flow Volatility
Volatility?
High
Low
(1)
(2)

Stock Volatility
High
Low
(3)
(4)

Analyst Forecast
High
Low
(5)
(6)

Tax Refund

1.061***
[0.266]

-0.113
[0.505]

1.972*
[1.015]

0.382
[0.843]

0.909
[1.193]

-0.748
[1.048]

Controls
Industry F.E.

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

Observations
R-squared

295

467

342

525

352

461

0.678

0.548

0.251

0.078

0.368

0.205

Panel B: Financial Constraints
Dependent Variable = Change in Cash
KZ Index
Financially Constrained? Yes
No
(1)
(2)

Payout
Yes
No
(3)
(4)

DFF
Yes
(5)

No
(6)

Tax Refund

-0.484
[0.520]

0.535
[1.254]

0.0661
[0.701]

0.749
[0.790]

0.359
[0.705]

0.951
[0.766]

Controls
Industry F.E.

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

Observations
R-squared

355
0.162

356
0.492

939
0.570

557
0.213

1,087
0.541

406
0.236

This table presents the coefficient β1 from empirical specifiation (2), the second-stage regression, and estimates
the effect of the tax refund on the change in cash. Panel A restricts the sample by three proxies for uncertainty:
firms in the top and bottom quartiles of Fama-French 48 industries based on the standard deviation of 10-year
cash flow volatility (columns 1 and 2, respectively), top and bottom industry quartiles of the standard deviation of
1-year stock returns (columns 3 and 4) and top and bottom industry quartiles of the dispersion of analyst yearahead earnings per share forecasts (columns 5 and 6). Panel B restricts the sample by three measures of firm
financial constraints. Columns 1 and 2 show results for subsamples of firms in the top and bottom quartiles of
the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 show results for subsamples of firms with zero
and non-zero dividend issuance and repurchases, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 show results for subsamples of
firms for which total payouts to operating income is and is not less than or equal to zero, respectively, as in
Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011). All uncertainty and financial constraint measures are calculated for the
year prior to tax refund receipt. Regressions include a second-order polynomial in the assignment variable "V",
industry fixed effects at the Fama-French 48 level, and the pre-treatment controls Tobin's q, ROA, cash
flow/assets, sales/assets, leverage, the marginal tax rate, ln(assets), and a quadratic in stimulus losses.
Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate levels of 1
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance, respectively.
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+
1,466
0.45

Observations
R-squared

1,478
0.37

+

+

966
0.237

+

+

[0.0752]

-0.179**

2,057
0.248

+
+

-0.0225
[0.0559]

966
0.211

+

+

[0.0768]

-0.201***

2,057
0.235

+
+

-0.0285
[0.0520]

Distanceto-Default
(2yr)
(4)

357
0.213

+

+

[0.0935]

-0.0922

747
0.116

+
+

0.103
[0.0696]

(12mF)
(5)

361
0.189

+

+

[0.0882]

-0.172*

754
0.115

+
+

0.0927
[0.0659]

(24mF)
(6)

364
0.191

+

+

[0.0789]

-0.205***

768
0.121

+
+

0.092
[0.0802]

(36mF)
(7)

S&P Credit Rating Downgrade

354
0.18

+

+

[0.0989]

-0.0272

744
0.116

+
+

0.00423
[0.0759]

(12mF)
(8)

358
0.196

+

+

[0.0823]

-0.0398

751
0.101

+
+

-0.0593
[0.0862]

(24mF)
(9)

362
0.221

+

+

[0.0883]

0.0108

756
0.114

+
+

-0.0647
[0.0818]

(36mF)
(10)

S&P Credit Rating Upgrade

This table presents the coefficient β1 from empirical specifiation (2), the second-stage regression, and estimates the effect of the tax refund on measures of bankruptcy
risk (Altman's z-score, Ohlson's o-score and distance-to-default in columns 1 to 4) and the probability of an S&P credit rating upgrade or downgrade (in columns 5 to
10). Panel A presents results from the 2002 policy period and Panel B presents results from the 2009 policy period. The coefficients are standardized to be interpreted
as the standard deviation change in the dependent variable resulting from a one standard deviation change in the firm tax refund. Regressions include a second-order
polynomial in the assignment variable "V", industry fixed effects at the Fama-French 48 level, and the pre-treatment controls Tobin's q, ROA, cash flow/assets,
sales/assets, leverage, the marginal tax rate, ln(assets), and a quadratic in stimulus losses. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are reported in
brackets. ***, ** and * indicate levels of 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance, respectively.

+

Industry F.E.

[0.0287]

[0.0649]
Controls

Tax Refund

3,290
0.139

-0.0540*

3,276
0.296

Observations
R-squared

+
+

-0.0106
[0.0471]

0.178***

+
+

Controls
Industry F.E.

Panel B: 2009 Policy

0.151*
[0.0911]

Tax Refund

Distanceto-Default
(1yr)
(3)

Bankruptcy Risk
Altman's Ohlson's
Dependent variable = Z-score O-score
(1)
(2)

Panel A: 2002 Policy

Table 10: Effect of the Tax Refund on Firm Financial Conditions

Table 11: Effect of Tax Refund Receipt on Probability of
Bankruptcy or Liquidation
Dependent Variable = Indicator for Bankruptcy or Liquidation
2002 Policy
2009 Policy
12mF
24mF
12mF
24mF
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Tax Refund

-0.106
[0.125]

-0.0585
[0.0675]

0.00669
[0.00905]

-0.136
[0.108]

Controls
Industry F.E.

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

Observations
R-squared

3,385
0.003

3,385
0.018

1,518
0.015

1,518
0.025

This table presents the coefficient β1 from empirical specification (2), the second-stage
regression, and shows the effect of tax refund receipt on the probability of future bankruptcy
or liquidation. The variables are standardized to be interpreted as the standard deviation
change in the dependent variable resulting from a one standard deviation change in the firm
tax refund. Regressions include a second-order polynomial in the assignment variable "V",
industry fixed effects at the Fama-French 48 level, and the pre-treatment controls Tobin's q,
ROA, cash flow/assets, sales/assets, leverage, the marginal tax rate, ln(assets), and a
quadratic in stimulus losses. Standard errors are clustered at the Fama-French 48 industry
level and are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate levels of 1 percent, 5 percent, and
10 percent significance, respectively.
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CHAPTER 2: State-Dependent Effects of Consumer Credit: The Payday Lending Case
2.1 Introduction
U.S. households are heavy users of credit. There was $13.2 trillion in household debt outstanding
in 2010—about equal to total U.S. gross domestic product in that year. Seventy-seven percent of
households held some form of debt, with the largest share of families holding mortgage debt
(48.7 percent), followed by installment debt (46.9 percent) and credit card balances (46.1
percent). Debt payments represent a considerable fraction of household income as well. The
median ratio of debt payments to family income was 18 percent for households holding debt in
2010.

20

Such high levels of household debt have tended to attract negative attention from the

public and the media. But is credit access truly harmful to households and the economy?
Economic theory suggests the effects on well-being are instead likely to be heterogeneous and
state-dependent. On one hand, canonical economic models of consumer credit show that credit
access improves household utility by allowing users to smooth consumption over income
fluctuations or other negative shocks. On the other hand, when individuals have an unusually
strong preference for current consumption—problems of “self control” when it comes to
consumption—credit access can lower household utility because household borrow to excess
(Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; Heidhues and Koszegi, 2010). In addition, credit
access may lower well-being for some borrowers due to asymmetric information between lenders
and borrowers, either because lenders are better able to forecast financial outcomes due to
experiences with many borrowers (Bond, Musto and Yilmaz, 2009), or because of borrowers’
poor financial literacy (Lusardi and Tufano, 2009). In these cases, individuals will borrow even if it
makes them worse off in the end.

20
Data are from 1) the Federal Reserve website, Flow of Funds Accounts, Table B.100, line 32 and 2) Bricker, Jesse,
Arthur B. Kennickell, Kevin B. Moore, and John Sabelhaus “Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010:
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances.” Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 98, no 2, (February 2012), pp. 1-80.

48

In this paper, I ask the question “How do the effects of consumer credit access on household
well-being vary with the economic state of the world?” I study the effect of access to one specific
form of credit: payday lending, the market for small-value, short-term loans taken at an annual
percentage rate of around 400 percent. Payday lending’s effect on household well-being has
been particularly controversial. Proponents of payday lending maintain that it is an important
backstop for families facing emergencies that lack access to other credit options (Andersen,
2011). Opponents of payday lending, however, charge that lenders trap poorly informed
individuals in a cycle of repeated borrowing at usurious interest rates and exacerbate financial
distress (Parrish and King, 2009).
I study the effects of payday lending on material well-being specifically, using data on household
spending from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE). Consumption is a natural outcome to
study with respect to credit access because in most theoretical models, households derive utility
from spending and credit access affects utility through a spending channel. In addition, household
spending is a better proxy of material well-being than household income from a theoretical
perspective and is a common measure of material well-being in the economics literature (Meyer
and Sullivan, 2004).
The payday lending market is a particularly suitable laboratory in which to evaluate the effects of
credit on well-being for two reasons. First, the arguments for and against payday lending tend to
mirror the theoretical arguments regarding effects of consumer credit more broadly. And empirical
work to date has far from resolved the argument. Authors have found highly mixed results of
payday lending on household financial conditions and other measures of well-being. On the
negative side, authors have found that payday borrowing results in households reporting difficulty
paying their rent, mortgage and other bills (Melzer, 2011), that it increases personal bankruptcy
filing rates (Skiba and Tobacman, 2011), and that it leads to declining job performance and
eligibility to re-enlist in the Air Force (Carrell and Zinman, 2008). On the positive side, authors
have found that access to payday loans mitigates foreclosures following natural disasters (Morse,
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2011), that banning payday lending results in more bounced checks and complaints against debt
collectors (Morgan, Strain and Seblani, 2012), and that capping payday loan interest rates leads
to households reporting a decline in overall financial conditions (Zinman, 2010). Bhutta (2014)
finds little evidence that payday lending has any effect on household financial conditions on
average. He finds no effect of payday access on credit scores, credit delinquencies, or the
likelihood of overdrawing credit lines.
The second reason payday lending is a suitable laboratory is that variation in access to payday
lending by geography and over time lends itself to identifying an effect of payday credit
particularly well. In general, it is difficult to isolate the effect of credit access on household
outcomes. Household credit and spending choices are determined simultaneously and are both
likely correlated with unobserved household characteristics, leading to issues of simultaneity bias
and omitted variable bias in regression analysis. In addition, access to credit is not randomly
assigned. Regulators and credit providers both play a role in determining household access to
credit. State regulatory actions may be confounded with other economic factors that can influence
household spending. And in the payday market particularly, lenders likely make location decisions
based on the characteristics of potential borrowers with the goal of maximizing profitability.
I address these challenges by following Melzer’s (2011) novel identification strategy, which
compares the spending patterns of two types of households that live in states banning payday
lending: 1) households who live close to the border of payday-allowing bordering state and hence
have access to payday loans, and 2) households that live far from the border of a paydayallowing state and hence do not have access to payday loans. This strategy ameliorates the
endogeneity concerns associated with studies that use state-level changes in payday loan
availability to identify the effects of lending.
I conduct two main tests. First, I analyze how payday lending affects household spending overall,
in the normal state of the world. I use confidential data on the census tract of each household in
the CE survey to calculate the distance of households in states prohibiting payday lending to
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states allowing payday lending. I look for effects on nondurable and durable goods spending
broadly as well as spending on specific items such as housing, food, and entertainment.
It is not a given that I should see any spending effects of the payday loan market overall since
these loans have to be repaid and theory suggests that credit access helps households smooth
consumption, not change consumption patterns. However, there are several reasons I may see
an effect overall. First, if payday lending itself increases economic hardship as opponents claim
and some work finds (Melzer, 2011; Skiba and Tobacman, 2011), I would expect to see that
payday loan access results in overall spending declines reflecting such financial distress. Second,
if the typical payday loan borrower has present-biased preferences that cause severe self-control
problems, I would expect that easy access to extra cash may exacerbate over-consumption.

21

In

this case, I may observe households spending more on luxury goods and services than they
would otherwise. While studying the spending effects of payday lending is not a direct test of
preferences by any means, observing increases in luxury good spending for households may be
indicative of self-control problems.
The second test I carry out is to directly study whether payday loan access helps families smooth
consumption during periods of temporary financial distress in a “bad” state of the world. I use
extreme weather events such as hurricanes and blizzards as an exogenous, negative shock to
households. I test whether households with payday loan access have higher spending after the
event than those without payday loan access. Severe weather events are strictly exogenous with
respect to spending and payday loan access and they also plausibly represent periods of
temporary financial distress. Severe storms can cause damage to one’s home or car, for
example, requiring unexpected outlays for repairs. Or bad weather can close one’s workplace,
causing a temporary drop in income for hourly workers. This analysis is similar to Morse (2011),

21
Payday borrowers are often associated with having present-biased preferences in the literature. The frequent rollover of
payday loans despite the high interest rates is consistent with non-standard preferences (Melzer, 2011). Estimating a
dynamic programming model of consumption, saving, borrowing and default, Skiba and Tobacman (2008) find default
patterns among payday loan users to be most the consistent with partially-naive quasi-hyperbolic discounting specifically.
And Parsons and Van Wesep (2012) examine the welfare effects of payday credit using a model where agents are paid at
regular intervals and are present-biased sophisticates.
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but I use a broader set of extreme weather events occurring over a wider geographic area and
time horizon. In addition, Morse’s work studies the effect of payday lending on foreclosures while
my work studies household consumption, allowing for a direct test of consumption smoothing.
My findings show that the effects of payday credit on household spending are heterogeneous and
state dependent. First, I show that granting households access to payday lending reduces
household material well-being on average, in a normal state of the world. Payday loan access
reduces aggregate reported household spending, with the majority of the spending reductions
occurring in shelter and food expenditures. I find that households with access to payday lending
report lower total expenditures, and that this effect is distributed in both nondurable and durable
spending. These results are concentrated in households with a greater propensity to be payday
borrowers—those with income between $15,000 and $50,000. In terms of the concentration of
spending reductions, I find that the spending reduction is concentrated in spending on shelter
(including rental payments as well as mortgage payments) and food (food at home and food away
from home) particularly. These results are consistent with loan access causing households
overall financial distress as critics contend. They are particularly consistent with Melzer’s (2011)
result that households with payday loan access report having difficulty paying their rent, mortgage
and other bills. I find only weak evidence that payday loan access results in an increase in
spending on luxury or so-called temptation goods; I see some evidence that households in the
$15,000 to $50,000 income range increase the level of spending on alcohol and tobacco products
but I see no change in spending on entertainment and I see a reduction in spending on apparel.
My second main finding shows that in a bad state of the world—following a temporary period of
financial distress—access to payday lending increases material well-being for the average
household. For households without payday loan access, an extreme weather event lowers
spending on nondurables (defined broadly) by $22 on average in the month of the event. For
those with payday loan access, however, spending is $35 higher after the shock than for those
without access. In particular, I find that payday loan access mitigates declines on food at home
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consumption, shelter spending, mortgage payments, and home repairs. Households without
payday loan access spend $31 and $18 less on shelter and home repairs in the month of an
extreme weather event than in a non-event month. Households with payday loan access spend
$30 and $36 more than households without access after the weather event. These results provide
a direct test showing following periods of financial distress, payday loan access smooths
consumption.
My work contributes to the empirical literature on payday lending by 1) highlighting the
heterogeneous, state-dependent nature of the effects of this market on household well-being and
by 2) reconciling some of the conflicting evidence to date on the welfare effects of payday
lending. As noted above, authors have found highly mixed results on the effects of payday loan
access on household well-being. To date, it has been difficult to reconcile these mixed results in
the literature, in large part due to the apples-and-oranges nature of the datasets and
methodologies used in the various analyses; the analyses were often simply not comparable.
Most studies find evidence of either positive or negative effects of payday lending on well-being.
As Melzer (2011) writes, for example: “I find no evidence that payday loans alleviate economic
hardship.” It is difficult to know if the conflicting findings are due to bias resulting form
methodological issues or if access to the payday loan market did have such heterogeneous
effects. My work shows that indeed, the effects of payday loans on household well-being are
heterogeneous and depend on whether the household is currently undergoing a period of
temporary distress or not. In bad states of the world, I find that payday lending helps smooth
consumption and improves material well-being. In normal states of the world, however, it worsens
material well-being for households.
My work should also be of interest to policymakers considering actions targeted at payday
lenders. The payday market remains the subject of much public policy attention in the United
States. Since 1999, 19 states have changed the legality of payday lending, with 11 allowing the
practice and 8 prohibiting it; a total of 14 states ban payday lending at present (Morgan, Strain
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and Seblani, 2012). In 2007, Congress responded to criticism that payday lenders target service
members by passing legislation that caps interest rates on loans to military personnel, effectively
banning payday lending to these individuals. In 2012, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) held hearings on payday lending to help gauge the potential role for additional federal
supervision of the market (CFBP, 2012). The CFPB has since included payday lenders as
institutions under their supervision and has taken several enforcement actions against payday
lenders for deceptive practices (CFPB, 2014). My results suggest that regulators’ concerns about
payday lending worsening household financial conditions overall are valid. However, my results
showing that payday lending does help households smooth consumption after temporary periods
of financial distress points to the need for continued access to emergency credit for creditconstrained households. Eliminating access to the payday loan market entirely could worsen wellbeing for households in distress.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 gives an overview of the payday
loan market. Section 2.3 presents the empirical methodology used for the analyses of the overall
effect of payday loan access and the effect of payday loan access after temporary periods of
financial distress. Section 2.4 describes the data used. Section 2.5 discusses the results and I
conclude in Section 2.6.

2.2 Overview of the Payday Loan Market
Payday lending is the practice of using a post-dated check or electronic checking account
information as collateral for a short-term, low-value, high interest rate loan. To qualify, borrowers
need personal identification, a valid checking account, and proof of steady income from a job or
government benefits, such as Social Security or disability payments.
The typical loan size ranges from $100 to $500 over a term of two weeks, the usual time span
between paydays, and the majority of loans are for $300 or less (Elliehausen 2009). Payday
lenders usually charge an average of $10 to $20 per $100 borrowed, which implies an interest
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rate of about 260% to 520% APR. Of new payday loans, 36% are repaid at the end of the initial
loan term and about another 20% are renewed once or twice. A considerable fraction of new
loans are renewed numerous times, however. Twenty-two percent are renewed six or more times
and over 10% of new loans are renewed ten or more times. Most borrowers take out just one
series of loans in a year (48%), but 26% of borrowers take out two series of loans, 15% take out
three series of loans, and 11% take out four or more series a year (CFPB, 2014).
In 2010, about 12 million individuals were estimated to have taken out a payday loan (PEW,
2012). Loan volume for store-front locations was estimated at $29.3 billion that year, with revenue
of $4.7 billion. Online payday loan volume, which has been growing rapidly, was estimated at
$10.8 billion with $2.7 billion in fees (Stephen’s Inc., 2012). Looking at demographics of
borrowers, they are more likely to be female, single-parents, African American, and have a highschool degree or some college education than the general population (Bourke, Horowitz and
Roche, 2012). Since one generally needs a valid bank account and pay stub as proof of
employment to qualify for a loan, payday borrowers are not in the poorest population cohort; still,
the typical borrower is part of a lower-than-average income household. Twenty-five percent of
payday borrowers report income of less than $15,000, while 56%have income between $15,000
and $50,000 and 16% report income greater than $50,000 (Bourke, Horowitz and Roche 2012;
note, the breakdown does not sum to 100% because some households do not report income).
Payday loan borrowers also tend to have limited liquid assets and be credit constrained. About
55% of borrowers reported not having savings or reserve funds in 2007. At the time of taking out
their most recent payday loan, about 45% reported not having a credit card and 22% reported
that they would have exceeded their credit limit if they had used a credit card. Twenty-eight
percent said they could have borrowed from a friend or relative, and 17% said they could have
used savings (Elliehausen, 2009).
In survey evidence for why households take out payday loans, 69% of borrowers reported using
their first loan for “recurring expenses:” 53% for regular expenses like utilities, car payments or
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credit cards, 10%for rent or mortgage payments, and 5% for food (Bourke, Horowitz and Roche
2012; note, the breakdown does not add to 69% due to rounding). Sixteen percent of payday
borrowers in the survey report using the loan for an “unexpected emergency/expense” while 8%
report using the loan for “something special,” and 7% report “other” or “don’t know.”

2.3 Empirical Methodology
2.3.1 Overall Effect of Payday Loan Access
To test the overall effect of payday loan access on household spending, I follow Melzer (2011)
and use a strategy that relies on variation in access to payday lending geographically and over
time. Many studies rely on state-level variation in the legality of payday lending or variation in
households’ proximity to a payday lender to identify an effect of lending on household outcomes
22

(Table 1 summarizes the state law changes).

These strategies raise concerns, however.

Legislative decisions are likely to be correlated with household financial conditions or other statelevel policies that may affect household welfare, which would result in the difference-in-difference
analysis not identifying a causal effect of payday loan access. Lenders’ location decisions are
also likely correlated with household characteristics and financial conditions, which may limit a
causal analysis.
To ameliorate these endogeneity concerns, Melzer’s strategy takes advantage of variation that is
independent of state-level legislative decisions or households’ proximity to particular payday
lending locations. The strategy compares two types of households that live in states that that ban
payday lending: 1) households that live close to the border of a state that allows payday lending
and hence, still have relatively easy access to the payday loan market and 2) households that live
far from the border of a payday-allowing state and hence, have limited payday-loan access.
Melzer provides suggestive evidence that borrowers travel across state borders to obtain payday

22

In order to preserve the confidentiality of the Consumer Expenditure Survey sampling areas, I cannot report the paydaybanning states included in the sample.
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loans—payday lenders have a higher propensity to locate near the borders of states that prohibit
payday loans after conditioning on local observable economic conditions.
The empirical model is as follows:
1 "H$&A6%7$'I( =  J!K!KDD$99I( + L M57$7I + >'( + )N( + :O;( + EN + E( +

'N(

In this model, i indexes households, c indexes census tracts and t indexes the month in which a
particular quarter’s spending ended. Expenditure is the dollar value or the log dollar value of
spending over the quarter ending in month t. The regression sample is limited to households in
states that ban payday lending. PaydayAccess is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a household
in a state that bans payday lending lives in a census tract within 25 miles of a state that allows
payday lending—Melzer’s cutoff for living close to a payday-allowing state. PaydayAccess equals
0 if a household lives in a state that bans payday lending but the household’s census tract is
farther than 25 miles from the border of a state that allows payday lending. W is a vector of
household-level controls: housing tenure, education level of the survey’s reference person, race
of the survey’s reference person, age of the reference person, family size, income class, and a
cubic in household income (as a proxy for permanent income). X is a vector of state-level
controls: personal income growth, the log of personal income, and the log of house prices. Z is a
vector of county-level controls: the unemployment rate and employment growth. I include fixed
effects for state and month (final month of the quarterly survey) in the model and cluster the
standard errors at the county level. I estimate the model using OLS for all households in the
sample as well as for households with income between $15,000 and $50,000 (households with
the greatest propensity to be payday borrowers, as in Melzer, 2011).
2.3.2 Effect of Payday Loan Access after a Temporary Negative Shock
In order to directly test whether payday lending helps households smooth consumption following
periods of temporary financial distress, I analyze whether payday loan access affects household
spending following an extreme weather event. Extreme weather events are exogenous with
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respect to household spending and represent plausible temporary, negative shocks to household
finances. An extreme weather event could prevent an hourly employee from making it to work for
several days, for example, acting as an income shock. In addition, weather could cause damage
to one’s home or car, requiring an unexpected outlay for repairs. This is a similar strategy used by
Morse (2011), except that Morse’s analysis relies on interacting the weather event with the
presence of a payday lender in a household’s zip code. As discussed above, defining payday
loan access as proximity to the border of a payday-allowing state has the advantage of being
independent from store location decisions.
To perform this analysis, I examine the interaction of access to payday lending and weather
shocks. I interact PaydayAccess with the dummy variable WeatherEvent that equals 1 if any
weather event that caused monetary damages occurred in the county in which a particular
census tract was located. The empirical model is as follows:
2 "H$&A6%7$'I(
=  J!K!KDD$99I( + L $!6ℎ$7 $&6;(
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The time indicator t now represents the month of household spending; I use monthly expenditures
in this analysis to match the month of the income shock with the month of spending.
PaydayAccess is defined as in the section above. The household-level, state-level, and countylevel controls are the same as above and I also include state and month fixed effects and cluster
standard errors at the county level.
In this model, the coefficient β2 measures the spending effects of experiencing an
extreme weather event in a given month when a household does not have access to payday
lending. The coefficient β3 measures the difference in spending after a weather event for
households with payday loan access compared to households without payday loan access. This
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coefficient will be positive if payday credit access boosts household spending during temporary,
negative shocks. The total spending effect of a weather shock when a household has payday
loan access is then β2 + β3. The spending effect of allowing payday lending when no weather
shock has occurred is measured by the coefficient β1.

2.4 Data
2.4.1 Consumer Expenditure Data
The main outcome variables of interest in this analysis are categories of household spending
including broad measures of spending (overall spending on durable goods and nondurable
goods) as well as more narrow categories (e.g., food, shelter, utilities and health care). I use data
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE), Interview Survey, a nationally representative
survey of spending that is published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). In the CE survey,
households are interviewed for five consecutive quarters on their spending over the previous
three months.

23

In addition to including highly detailed data on household spending, the survey

also includes detailed data on household demographics and data on household balance sheets.
There are about 7,000 households surveyed a quarter, for a total of about 28,000 surveys
collected a year and there are a total of 91 geographic sampling areas across the country.
The geographic information available in the public-use Consumer Expenditure (CE) survey data
files are limited to state and MSA-level indicators, which are only available for a subset of
households. In order to construct the measure of a CE household’s distance to the closest state
that allows payday lending, I use confidential data on each household’s census tract location
accessed at the BLS headquarters.
I study four aggregate measures of expenditures as well as a number of specific spending
categories. The aggregate measures that I study are 1) total household expenditures, 2) a broad

23
Note, a “consumer unit”, which is defined an independent financial entity within a household, is the unit of observation in
the survey. I will use the term “household” interchangeably with consumer unit.
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measure of nondurable expenditures, 3) a narrow measure of nondurable expenditure categories
(following Lusardi, 1996), and total durable goods. The specific expenditure categories I use
follow from the major breakdown of goods as in Kearney (2004). I deflate expenditures to
constant 2010 dollars using the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U, not
seasonally adjusted). For analysis of the overall effect of payday loan access on household
spending, I use data at the quarterly spending level.
To construct the sample, I follow the literature in limiting the sample to exclude households living
in student housing, those that report an age of less than 21 or greater than 85, those that
incompletely report income, those that report age changing by more than one between quarters,
or those that report the number of children changing by more 3 between quarters. I provide a
detailed description of how the spending variables, household credit variables, and data sample
were constructed in Appendix 4. I use a data sample from 1998 to 2010 as the payday lending
market started developing in the 1990s and the first payday loan access law change was in 1999.
I end the sample in 2010 in order to limit confounding effects of the online payday lending market,
which has been growing over time (Bourke, Horowitz and Roche 2012). Since households in any
state may access payday loans online, the growth of this market confounds the geographic
variation used to identify the effects of payday loan access in this paper.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the expenditure categories that I analyze in this study—
quarterly average spending levels and standard deviations, indexed to 2010 dollars using the
CPI-U. Column 1 shows households that do not have access to payday lending and column 2
shows households that have access to payday spending (about 70 percent of the qualified
household). Average spending for both groups totals around $11,000 a quarter with spending on
durable goods making up about two-thirds of total spending. Nondurable spending defined
broadly totals about $3,750 a quarter while nondurables spending defined narrowly totals about
$2,750. The largest individual categories of spending are shelter ($2,500), transportation ($2,000)
and food at home ($1,100). Notably, while there is no statistical differences in the aggregate
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spending levels of each group, there are larger differences in the breakdown of spending by
detailed category. Households without payday loan access spend more on housing, food, and
apparel expenditures, while households with payday loan access spend more on health care and
entertainment.
I present summary statistics for household demographics of households with and without payday
loan access in Table 3. There is no statistical difference between these households in terms of
income, marital status, or education levels. Households without payday access are more likely to
be homeowners and the family size is slightly larger in households with payday loan access (2.54
versus 2.51). The share of Caucasian households does not differ between the two samples, but
the rest of the racial composition does; households with access to payday lending are more likely
to be Hispanic or Asian and less likely to be African American.
2.4.2 Weather Event Data
To test whether payday lending improves material well-being in the face of a negative shock to
household financial conditions, I use data on extreme weather events from the University of
South Carolina’s Sheldus Hazard Database. This database compiles county-level information on
dollar losses and fatalities from 18 types of events including hurricanes, thunder storms, floods,
and blizzards. By using data on household location, I can more precisely match extreme weather
events to the households most likely to have been affected by these weather events. As
discussed above, in order to more precisely match the timing of weather events to the timing of
household spending, I use monthly spending data in the CE files for this analysis.
I present summary statistics for the weather event dataset in Table 4. In order to preserve
confidentiality of the CE sampling areas, the information I present is limited but shows that
extreme weather events occur frequently for households in the CE sample studied here and that
the economic magnitude of these events is economically meaningful. Of the total number of
monthly household spending observations in the sample (192,000), weather caused property
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damage in a household’s county in about a third of those months (67,000). These weather events
affect a considerable number of households with payday loan access; among these households,
there were 22,000 monthly household observations in which weather damage was recorded in a
household’s county. In any month with damage, the average property damage recorded for a
county was about $1.4 million. The weather events with the greatest frequency of occurring in the
total sample are storm events (25,782), wind events (23,094), wind-related winter weather (9,460)
and flooding (8,518). Multiple weather events in a given month are a frequent occurrence.

2.5 Results
2.5.1 Results: Overall Effect of Payday Loan Access
I first investigate the overall effect of payday loan access on aggregate household expenditures.
Table 5 shows the estimated coefficient on PaydayAccess from the regression specification in
equation (1); the table shows results for four measures of aggregate spending: total expenditures,
nondurable expenditures defined broadly, nondurable expenditures defined narrowly, and durable
good expenditures. I present results for all households in the sample as well as for households
with incomes between $15,000 and $50,000—the income range in which the majority of payday
loan borrowers fall (following Melzer (2011)). I present results for specifications with household
expenditures defined both in levels and the natural logarithm of expenditures. The coefficient in
the levels specification can be interpreted as the dollar change in quarterly household spending
resulting from access to the payday loan market. The coefficient in the log-linear specification can
be interpreted as the percentage change in quarterly household spending resulting from access
to the payday loan market. Utilizing a log-linear specification has the advantage of mitigating the
effects of any outliers in the regression; for this reason, the log-linear specification may be
preferred to the levels specification.
The results show households with payday loan access have lower household spending on
average, across aggregate spending categories. The estimated coefficient on PaydayAccess is
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negative in each regression, indicating that payday access reduces household expenditures on
aggregate expenditures—nondurable expenditures as well as durable expenditures. For all
households on the sample, I find that payday access results in a 5.5 percent reduction in total
household spending on average. The corresponding dollar value reduction is about $600 a
quarter, although this estimate is not statistically significant. The results indicate that payday loan
access reduces nondurables spending using both the narrow and broad definitions of
nondurables spending. Nondurable spending defined narrowly falls by about $220 a quarter (6.3
percent), while nondurable spending defined broadly falls by about $310 a quarter (6.3 percent);
the estimated effect of payday loan access is significant in both the levels and log-linear
specification. As there are 1.7 adults per household, this corresponds to a monthly spending
reduction of about $40 and $60 a month, respectively. I find a reduction in durables spending as
well (5.3%), although again the reduction is only statistically significant for the log specification. I
see similar results when limiting the data sample to households in the $15,000 to $50,000 income
class. I see that households in this income range also report lower household expenditures
across aggregate spending categories. In this set of regressions, however, the effect of payday
loan access on household spending is statistically significant more often in the levels
specification. The effect on overall expenditures is now significant when measured in levels as
well as in logs; the coefficient can be interpreted as households with payday loan access
reporting $575 lower total expenditures ($112 per adult, per month).
The relatively large magnitude of the regression coefficient estimates raises the question of
whether these magnitudes are plausible. It is likely that loan fees for payday loans are
underreported in the CE and that the reduction in aggregate expenditures reflects a reduction in
expenditures excluding loan charges. While banking fees and finance fees are reported in the
quarterly CE survey, households are known to underreport expenditures for so-called “sin” goods
and services (gambling, alcohol and tobacco for example), of which payday loan fees may be
included. The average payday loan has a $20 fee per $100 of loans spent and since the typical
loan is around $300 or less, that implies a fee of about $60 per loan. A $125 spending reduction
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per adult, per month would suggest that two loans are being taken out per person in the survey
on average each month. While a large fraction of payday loans are rolled over for at least one
additional period and payday borrowers report taking a number of loans through the month, this is
likely an implausibly large magnitude. Below I investigate other explanations for the spending
reduction than the reduction solely being due to a payday loan charges not being included in
reported household spending.
Next I examine how the spending reductions are split between the detailed expenditure
categories. Table 6 shows the coefficient on PaydayAccess from empirical specification (1), with
each row representing a separate regression coefficient on the listed expenditure category as the
dependent variable. Columns 1 and 2 in the table show estimates from a log-linear and linear
regression specification, respectively, for all households in the sample. Columns 3 and 4 show
corresponding estimates for households in the $15,000 to $50,000 income category. I find that
households with payday loan access report the largest reductions in spending on shelter and on
food. I see that households with payday loan access on average spend $570 less a quarter on
shelter (a category that includes broad expenditures on both owned dwellings and rented
dwellings). Shelter expenditures only include spending on mortgage interest, not mortgage
principle. The mortgage category reported in the table shows total mortgage payment spending
(principle and interest) and the results show that households with payday loan access spend
about $250 less a quarter on mortgage expenditures. Households with payday loan access spend
about $150 less in rent payments per quarter.
The reductions in spending on food resulting from payday loan access are also substantial.
These households spend $87 and $88 less a quarter on food at home and food away from home,
respectively, than households without payday loan access. The coefficient estimates are
significant for these expenditure categories in both the level and the log-linear regression
specifications, for all households and for households in the $15,000 and $50,000 income
category. The other notable category of spending declines is in apparel; households spend $72
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less on apparel a quarter and the reductions in apparel spending are significant across all 4
specifications reported in the table. I see some small reduction in health care spending for
households with payday loan access, although only in the log-linear specification for all
households.
These results are in line with Melzer’s (2011) findings that access to payday loan credit overall
causes households to report having more difficulty paying the rent, the mortgage, and medical
bills. They also accord with his conclusions that for low-income households, payday loan fees
result in households having fewer funds to spend on other bills.
One channel for payday loan access affecting other categories of household spending is if loan
fees result in households having fewer funds available for other expenditures. Another reason
that payday loan access could affect household spending, however, is if the typical payday loan
borrower has present-biased preferences that cause severe self-control problems. In this case,
easy access to extra cash may exacerbate over-consumption, causing households to spend more
on luxury goods and services than they would otherwise. I investigate this hypothesis by looking
at whether payday loan access causes any change in spending on in so-called temptation goods
(as in Bertrand and Morse, 2009), particularly spending on alcohol, tobacco, and entertainment. I
only find weak evidence to support this hypothesis. I find that households with payday access in
the $15,000 to $50,000 income category report a $45 increase a month in spending on alcohol
and tobacco products, and this increase is significant at the 1 percent level. It is not significant in
the other specifications, however. I also see no significant increase in entertainment in spending
overall.
Finally, I also find a sizeable increase in transportation spending for households with payday loan
access ($194 or about an 8 percent increase). This result raises the question of whether
PaydayAccess is correlated with other commuting-related expenses that may be affecting the
other spending results as well (perhaps explaining why the magnitude of the effects is so large). I
have further work to do to investigate this possibility.
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2.5.2 Results: Effect of Payday Loan Access following a Temporary Negative Shock
Next, I investigate the whether access to the payday loan market affects spending following
periods of temporary financial distress, represented by an extreme weather event occurring in the
month. Using the extreme weather events as a natural experiment, this analysis provides a direct
test of whether credit access helps household smooth spending around negative shocks. First I
study the effects on aggregate household spending, using the four measures studied above.
Table 7 shows results from empirical specification (2), which interacts the effects of payday loan
access and a weather event occurring in a given month. Each column represents one regression
of the dependent variable named at the top of the column on the explanatory variables as well as
the control variables described above. Panel A of Table 7 shows results for the specification with
the dependent variables in levels and Panel B shows results for the natural logarithm of the
dependent variable.
I find evidence that payday lending does play a valuable consumption smoothing role for
households facing temporary periods of financial distress; households with payday loan access
spend more on nondurables after temporary, negative financial shocks than those without payday
loan access. For households without payday loan access, an extreme weather event lowers
monthly spending on nondurables defined broadly by $22 on average and on nondurables
defined narrowly by $15 on average. For those with payday loan access, however, monthly
spending is $35 higher and $30 higher on broad and narrow nondurables, respectively, than for
those without access after the weather shock. I see a similar result in the log-linear specification.
An extreme weather event reduces reported household spending on both broad and narrow
nondurables by 1.4 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively for households without payday access.
Household with payday loan access, however, report 2.8 percent and 2.6 percent higher
spending than households without payday loan access following the weather event. I do not see
an effect on total expenditures in either specification, however, because there is no statistically
significant effect on durable good spending.
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Looking at the effect of payday loan access on specific spending categories following a weather
event (Table 8), I find a similar pattern as above for expenditures on several specific categories—
food at home, shelter spending, mortgage payments, and home repairs. As in Table 7, Panel A
shows a specification with the expenditure measured in levels and Panel B shows a specification
with the expenditure measured as a natural logarithm. I show results for the categories with
statistically significant results. The results for food expenditures at home are the most robust
across specifications. Extreme weather events result in a reduction of $7 (1.5 percent) in monthly
spending on food at home for households without payday loan access. For those with payday
access, spending on food at home is $12 (2.9 percent) higher after the weather event than for
those without payday loan access.
Shelter and home repairs are a second category in which I see statistically significant effects of
payday loan access following an extreme weather event. For households without access to
payday lending, monthly expenditures on shelter overall and on mortgage payments are $31 and
$11 lower, respectively. For those with payday access, spending is $30 and $19 higher after the
weather event than for those without. Home repair expenditures are $18 lower following a
weather event for households without payday loan access. Payday loan access more than
mitigates that decline in home repairs; households with access spend $36 more on home repairs
after the weather event than those without access. These results provide a clean test that
following periods of financial distress, payday loan access helps households smooth
consumption. My result for mortgage payments are in line with Morse’s (2011) results that show
payday lending mitigates the increase in foreclosures that occurs following natural disasters in
California. I build on Morse’s work by showing a direct consumption smoothing mechanism that
mitigating financial distress. In addition, I show that the consumption effect is broader than in
mortgage payments alone.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate whether households benefit from increased access to payday credit—a
market that has grown rapidly since the late 1990s and that has come under regulatory scrutiny
for the high fees charged per loan transaction. I study the effects of payday loan access on
household material well-being for households in two states of the world: 1) the average effect in a
“normal” state of the world and 2) the effect of access in a “bad” state of the world (households
that have recently experienced a temporary, negative shock to household finances). I show that
the effect on material well-being is state dependent. Under normal conditions, payday loan
access reduces average household spending on non-loan expenditures substantially, particularly
expenditures on rent, mortgage payments and food. After temporary periods of financial distress
(an extreme weather event), however, payday loan access mitigates the spending declines that
occur for households that experience the shock but don’t have access to payday credit; loan
access helps households smooth consumption over the shock.
These results provide empirical evidence on the heterogeneous nature consumer credit’s on
household well-being; the effects vary even within the market for one specific credit product. The
finding that payday loan access results in household spending declines overall is consistent with
evidence in the literature to date that payday lending is indeed associated with increased
economic hardship for households overall. In distressed conditions, however, payday lending
does appear to aid households facing emergencies, helping households keep food on the table
and pay the mortgage.
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Figures and Tables

Table 1: Payday Loan Laws by State
Always Banned
CT
ME
MA
NJ
NY
VT

Always Legal
CA
CO
DE
FL
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS

KY
LA
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NM

OH
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
WA
WI
WY

Source: Morgan, Strain, and Seblani, 2012
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Banned

Legalized

AR (Dec. 07)
DC (Nov. 07)
GA (May 04)
MD (Jun. 00)
NC (Dec. 05)
OR (Jul. 07)
PA (Nov. 07)
WV (Jun.06)

AL (Jun. 03)
AK (Jun. 04)
AZ (Apr. 00)
AR (Apr. 99)
HI (Jul. 99)
MI (Nov. 05)
NH (Jan. 00)
ND (Apr. 01)
OK (Sep. 03)
RI (Jul. 01)
VA (Apr. 02)

Table 2: Summary Statistics, Expenditure Categories

Total Expenditures
Nondurables: Narrow
Nondurables: Broad
Durable Goods

Payday Access = 0
Mean
SD
11,069
10,527
2,758
3,262
3,750
3,854
7,320
7,820

Food at home
Food away from home
Shelter
Rent Payments
Mortgage Payments
Utilities
Household Operations
Health Care
Education
Alcohol and tobacco
Apparel
Entertainment
Transportation

1,149
471
2,579
723
1,062
844
529
596
254
172
360
526
1,796

Sample size:

44,332

759
900
2,944
1,290
2,085
607
1,667
934
1,718
325
666
1,151
3,861

Payday Access = 1
Mean
SD
10,959
9,738
2,733
2,320
3,739
3,076
7,220
7,794
1,132
454
2,317
543
1,187
869
517
653
255
176
318
551
1,827

742
933
2,519
1,105
2,146
541
1,519
918
1,752
326
972
1,814
3,950

(P-value difference)
0.20
0.27
0.73
0.14
0.01
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.37
0.00
0.96
0.15
0.00
0.07
0.35

19,276

Table 3: Summary Statistics: Demographic Variables

Income

Payday Access = 0
Mean
Std. Dev.
51.10
61.91

Payday Access = 1
Mean
Std. Dev
51.09
59.44

(P-Value of
Difference)
0.99

Married
Homeowner
Family Size
Age

0.54
0.65
2.56
50.39

0.50
0.48
1.47
15.84

0.54
0.71
2.51
50.25

0.50
0.46
1.41
15.63

0.31
0.00
0.00
0.32

Race
White
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Other

0.79
0.16
0.04
0.10
0.01

0.41
0.36
0.19
0.30
0.10

0.79
0.16
0.03
0.05
0.02

0.40
0.37
0.16
0.22
0.13

0.83
0.11
0.00
0.00
0.00

Education
Below High School
High School
Some College
Bachelors or higher

0.15
0.28
0.26
0.31

0.36
0.45
0.44
0.46

0.15
0.29
0.26
0.30

0.36
0.45
0.44
0.46

0.20
0.27
0.81
0.77

Sample size:

44,332

19,276
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Table 4: Summary Statistics: Weather Events
Obs. in data sample:
Obs. with a weather event in the county:
Any
Flooding
All Storm Events
Wind
Wind/Winter weather
Obs. with payday loan access and any weather event in the county:
Mean county property damage in a month with a weather event:

192,329
66,748
8,518
25,782
23,094
9,460
22,178
$1,366,424

Table 5: Effect of Payday Loan Access on Household Expenditures
All Income
Ln
Level
(1)
(2)
Dependent Variable:
Total Expenditures

Income 15-50K
Ln
Level
(3)
(4)

-0.0556**
[0.0257]

-599.6
[366.4]

-0.0484*
[0.0263]

-575.3*
[294.3]

Nondurables: Narrow

-0.0626**
[0.0301]

-218.9**
[103.1]

-0.0512
[0.0359]

-162.2*
[90.50]

Nondurables: Broad

-0.0629**
[0.0276]

-313.5**
[129.3]

-0.0441
[0.0312]

-260.1**
[114.3]

Durable Goods

-0.0530*
[0.0273]

-286.1
[252.3]

-0.0531*
[0.0278]

-315.2
[204.6]

63,605

63,605

21,028

21,028

Obs.

This table presents results from empirical specification (1), regressions of quarterly
expenditure categories on PaydayAccess, household-level controls (housing tenure,
education level, race, age, family size, income class, and a cubic in household income),
state-level controls (personal income growth, the log of personal income, and the log of
house prices), county-level controls (the unemployment rate and employment growth) and
state and year fixed effects. Each cell reports estimates for a separate regression using the
dependant variables listed by row. Standard errors are presented in brackets below the
coefficient estimates and are clustered at the county level. The sample period is 1998 to
2010. ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance, respectively.
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Table 6: Effect of Payday Loan Access on Household Expenditures
Ln
(1)
Dependent Variables:
Shelter

All Income
Level
(2)

Income 15-50K
Ln
Level
(3)
(4)

-0.188***
[0.0559]

-571.4***
[170.5]

-0.202***
[0.0624]

-454.4***
[138.9]

Rent Payments

-0.140**
[0.0651]

-149.2**
[59.98]

-0.164**
[0.0758]

-194.5***
[71.39]

Mortgage Payments

-0.202***
[0.0595]

-257.6***
[87.99]

-0.287***
[0.0814]

-156.2**
[60.58]

-0.0698**
[0.0316]

-86.92**
[38.71]

-0.0844**
[0.0428]

-115.4**
[46.88]

Food Away From Home -0.161***
[0.0510]

-87.52***
[30.11]

-0.169**
[0.0661]

-71.96**
[31.23]

Food At Home

Alcohol and Tobacco

-0.036
[0.0395]

15.01
[10.75]

0.0721
[0.0625]

43.96***
[14.64]

Utilities

0.0285
[0.0275]

-9.389
[22.06]

0.0598**
[0.0284]

25.46
[21.30]

Health Care

-0.0606**
[0.0294]

-29.65
[24.78]

-0.0452
[0.0444]

-39.45
[33.16]

Transportation

0.0818*
[0.0424]

194.3**
[88.32]

0.0926*
[0.0539]

144.6
[111.6]

Education

-0.182
[0.115]

-2.62
[37.90]

0.0913
[0.156]

26.72
[31.91]

Apparel

-0.144***
[0.0445]

-72.46***
[22.79]

-0.115**
[0.0572]

-67.52***
[21.70]

Entertainment

0.0153
[0.0285]

28.16
[28.60]

0.0133
[0.0341]

0.449
[20.82]

No. Households

63,605

63,605

21,028

21,028

This table presents results from empirical specification (1), regressions of quarterly
expenditure categories on PaydayAccess, household-level controls (housing tenure,
education level, race, age, family size, income class, and a cubic in household income),
state-level controls (personal income growth, the log of personal income, and the log of
house prices), county-level controls (the unemployment rate and employment growth) and
state and year fixed effects. Each cell reports estimates for a separate regression using
the dependant variables listed by row. Standard errors are presented in brackets below the
coefficient estimates and are clustered at the county level. The sample period is 1998 to
2010. ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance, respectively.
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Table 7: Effect of Payday Loan Access on Expenditures After Extreme
Weather Events
Panel A: Level Specification
Dependent Variable:

WeatherEvent

Total
Nondurables: Nondurables:
Expenditures
Narrow
Broad
-51.25
-15.37*
-22.04*
[31.62]
[7.931]
[11.68]

Durables
-29.21
[23.48]

WeatherEventXPaydayAccess

84.96
[53.15]

30.15**
[14.34]

34.90*
[20.26]

50.06
[39.56]

PaydayAccess

-88.39
[100.5]

-46.64
[28.68]

-67.02*
[35.75]

-21.37
[71.08]

Obs.
R-squared

192,148
0.466

191,955
0.426

192,012
0.41

192,100
0.411

Panel B: Ln Specification
Dependent Variable:

WeatherEvent

Total
Nondurables: Nondurables:
Expenditures
Narrow
Broad
-0.00992
-0.0140**
-0.0145**
[0.00727]
[0.00709]
[0.00729]

Durables
-0.00449
[0.00789]

WeatherEventXPaydayAccess

0.0151
[0.0130]

0.0281**
[0.0122]

0.0255*
[0.0132]

0.000426
[0.0153]

PaydayAccess

-0.03
[0.0219]

-0.0376
[0.0249]

-0.0415*
[0.0230]

-0.019
[0.0244]

Obs.
R-squared

192,148
0.466

191,955
0.426

192,012
0.41

192,100
0.411

This table presents results from empirical specification (2). WeatherEvent is a dummy variables equal to
1 if a household lives in a county that experienced a weather event in a month. Regressions include
household-level controls (housing tenure, education level, race, age, family size, income class, and a
cubic in household income), state-level controls (personal income growth, the log of personal income, and
the log of house prices), county-level controls (the unemployment rate and employment growth) and state
and year fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in brackets below the coefficient estimates and are
clustered at the county level. The sample period is 1998 to 2010. ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5
percent and 10 percent significance, respectively.
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-21.15***
[7.312]
147,242
0.244

-15.15
[10.74]
191,003
0.373

PaydayAccess

No. Obs
R-squared

-0.123***
[0.0384]
147,242
0.244

-0.035
[0.0257]
191,003
0.373

PaydayAccess

No. Obs
R-squared

189,543
0.484

-0.0775**
[0.0381]

0.00966
[0.0182]

62,771
0.381

-0.0316
[0.0429]

0.0201
[0.0210]

Rent
0.00282
[0.0106]

62,771
0.381

-22.07
[14.65]

5.38
[4.927]

-6.932**
[3.242]

Rent

187,429
0.323

2.681
[5.765]

-3.303
[4.088]

3.800*
[2.273]

Utilities

73,276
0.247

-0.135***
[0.0485]

0.0301
[0.0213]

187,429
0.323

0.0420**
[0.0199]

-0.0202
[0.0128]

Mortgage
Payments Utilities
-0.0154
0.0144*
[0.0114] [0.00816]

Dependent Variable:

73,276
0.247

-59.84**
[25.58]

18.72**
[8.980]

-11.18*
[5.712]

Mortgage
Payments

Dependent Variable:

143,062
0.164

-0.0486*
[0.0265]

-0.00161
[0.0200]

Health
Care
0.000673
[0.0127]

143,062
0.164

-10.39
[7.620]

5.821
[6.638]

-0.656
[3.919]

Health
Care

116,778
0.141

-0.0511
[0.0380]

0.0035
[0.0217]

Apparel
-0.00184
[0.0143]

116,778
0.141

-12.88*
[7.533]

-1.626
[6.021]

-5.793**
[2.773]

Apparel

30,102
0.084

3.566
[23.66]

35.69*
[18.50]

-18.10*
[9.691]

178,496
0.256

0.0375
[0.0308]

-0.00635
[0.0169]

30,102
0.084

-0.0569
[0.0899]

0.105*
[0.0548]

Transport Home
ation
Repairs
0.0108
-0.0449
[0.00862] [0.0328]

178,496
0.256

45.80*
[26.24]

17.97
[23.38]

-3.591
[15.30]

Transport Home
ation
Repairs

This table presents results from empirical specification (2). WeatherEvent is a dummy variables equal to 1 if a household lives in a county that experienced a
weather event in a month. Regressions include household-level controls (housing tenure, education level, race, age, family size, income class, and a cubic in
household income), state-level controls (personal income growth, the log of personal income, and the log of house prices), county-level controls (the unemployment
rate and employment growth) and state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in brackets below the coefficient estimates and are clustered at the
county level. The sample period is 1998 to 2010. ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance, respectively.

0.0419**
[0.0203]

WeatherEventXPaydayAccess0.0286**
[0.0115]

WeatherEvent

189,543
0.484

-115.4***
[43.94]

30.16*
[17.09]

-31.16***
[9.639]

Food
Food at away from
home
home
Shelter
-0.0145** -0.0230** -0.00493
[0.00659] [0.0113]
[0.0106]

5.546
[4.860]

WeatherEventXPaydayAccess 12.11**
[5.573]

Panel B: Ln Specification

-0.626
[3.183]

-7.183**
[2.805]

WeatherEvent

Food
Food At Away from
Home
Home
Shelter

Table 8: Effect of Payday Loan Access on Detailed Expenditures After Extreme Weather Events
Panel A: Level Specification

APPENDIX
Appendix 1. Variable Construction
The analysis relies on constructing estimates of the firm losses and previous-years’ profits that
were available to apply to the carryback policy, as well as the size of the firm tax refund received
as a result of the policy.
1) Taxable income and tax rates:
A. I define taxable income as follows, with Compustat variable names in parenthesis:
Taxable Income = Domestic Pretax Income (PIDOM) – Federal Deferred Taxes
(TXDFED)/τ + Extraordinary Items and Discontinued Operations (XIDO) /(1- τ)
Here, τ =0.35 is assumed to be the marginal tax rate. Pretax Income equals Operating
Income After Depreciation (OIADP) – Interest and Related Expenses (XINT) + Special
Items (SPI) + Non-Operating Income (NOPI). When domestic pretax income and federal
deferred taxes are missing, I use total Pretax Income (PI) and Deferred Income Taxes
(TXDI). I replace any missing values for extraordinary items with zero.
B. I define the tax rate as follows:
Tax Rate = Federal Income Taxes (TXFED)/Taxable Income
If data on federal income taxes paid are missing, I replace missing values with Total
Income Taxes (TXT) – Foreign Income Taxes (TXFO) – State Income Taxes (TXS) –
Deferred Taxes (TXDI) – Other Income Taxes (TXO). I replace missing values for foreign
income taxes, state income taxes, deferred taxes and other income taxes with zeros.
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2) Losses to apply to the five-year carryback policy:
A. For the 2002 policy period, I assume a firm would have applied any 2001 losses
(negative taxable income) to the 2002 refund and any 2002 losses to the 2003 refund.
B. For the 2009 policy period, firms were only allowed to apply either 2008 or 2009 losses to
the five-year carryback.

•

I estimate the potential tax refunds if the firm applied 2008 losses or applied 2009
losses to the five-year carryback. I assume that firms would have chosen the higher
refund.

•

If I estimate that the firm would have applied the 2008 losses to the five-year
carryback policy, losses that apply to the policy for the 2010 refund equal 2008 plus
2009 losses. I assume the firm would also have applied any 2009 losses to the
standard two-year carryback policy in that year.

•

If I estimate that the firm applied the 2009 losses to the five-year carryback policy,
losses that apply to the 2010 refund just equal the 2009 losses. Firms cannot receive
any additional refund based on 2008 losses.

3) Previous-years’ profits to apply to the policy:
A. For each year in the five-year carryback window, if any year in the window had a loss—
year(t)—I calculate if there were any adjustments for a two-year carryback during that
time.
a. If the firm had profits in year(t-2):

•

If profits(t-2) were larger than the loss(t), I assume the firm received a refund for the
loss(t). The profits(t-2) remaining for the five-year carryback policy equal profits(t-2)
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minus the losses(t). The firm has no more losses to apply to the two-year
carryback.

•

If profits(t-2) were smaller than the loss, I assume the firm received a refund for the
profits(t-2). Profits(t-2) remaining for the five-year carryback policy are zero.
Losses(t) that remain to apply to a refund equal losses(t) minus profits(t-2).

b. If the firm had profits(t-1) and had losses(t) remaining to apply for a carryback:

•

If profits(t-1) were larger than the remaining loss(t), I assume the firm received a
refund for the whole loss(t). The profits(t-1) remaining for the five-year carryback
policy equal profits(t-1) minus the loss(t).

•

If profits(t-1) were smaller than the loss(t), I assume the firm received a refund for
the profit(t-1). Profits(t-1) remaining for the five-year carryback policy are zero.

B. For profits that applied to the 2002 tax refund, previous-years’ profits that were potentially
available for the tax refund in 2002 equal the sum of profits from 1996 to 2001 that
remained on the firm’s books.
C. For profits that applied to the 2003 tax refund, I assume that any profits applied to the
2002 tax refund were not available for the 2003 tax refund.
a. If the 2001 loss was larger than the sum of profits from 1996 to 2000 that could apply
to the policy, previous-years’ profits that apply to the 2003 refund equal zero.
b. If the 2001 loss was smaller than the 1996 profit that could be applied to the refund,
previous-years’ profits that applied to the 2003 refund equal the sum of profits from
1997 to 2000.
c.

If the 2001 loss was larger than the 1996 profit that could be applied to the refund but
smaller than the total sum of profits from1996 to 2000, previous-years’ profits that
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applied to the 2003 refund equaled the sum of profits from 1996 to 2000 minus the
2001 loss.
d. If 2001 was a profit year, the previous-years’ profits that could apply to the 2003
refund equal the sum of profits from 1997 to 2001.
D. For profits that applied to the 2010 tax refund, if I calculate that firms apply 2008 losses to
the five-year carryback policy, profits that apply equal the sum of profits from 2003 to
2007. If I calculate that firms apply 2009 losses to the five-year carryback policy, profits
that apply to the policy equal the sum of profits from 2004 to 2008.
Tax Refunds:
To calculate the tax refund each firm would have received, I assume that firms receive a
th

th

rd

refund based on the 5 year of the window first, then the 4 year of the window, then the 3
th

year etc… Note that for the 2009 policy period, only 50 percent of profits in the 5 year of the
window could apply to the policy.
Starting with the last year of the window, year(t-5):
A. If the firm’s policy losses(t) are larger than the profits in year(t-5), the tax refund equals that
year’s tax rate times profits(t-5) available. The losses(t) that now can apply to a refund
equals losses(t) minus profits(t-5). Profits(t-5) remaining to apply for another carryback equal
zero.
B. If the firm’s policy losses are smaller than the profits in that year, the tax refund equals
the year’s tax rate times the losses(t) available. The firm has now exhausted the losses
available to apply to the policy. Profits(t-5) remaining to apply for another carryback equal
profits(t-5) minus losses(t).
C. I repeat the algorithm for the other 4 years in the window.
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Appendix 2. Variable Definitions
I source financial and accounting data from the Compustat fundamental annual database
and the CRSP daily and monthly annual update databases. I source data on firm credit ratings
from the Capital IQ S&P credit ratings database. I source data on analyst forecast dispersion from
I/B/E/S and data on firm marginal tax rates are from John Graham. Variables definitions used in
the analysis are as follows:
Investment = CAPXV – SPPE
Change in cash = CH − CHt-1
Change in total debt = (DLC + DLTT) − (DLCt-1 + DLTTt-1)
Change in long-term debt = DLTT − DLTTt-1
Change in short-term debt = DLC − DLCt-1
Payout = DVC + PRSTKC
Change in short-term investments = IVST − IVSTt-1
Change in investments = IVCH
Acquisitions = AQC
Change in Employment = EMP − EMPt-1
Altman’s z-score = 3.3*EBIT/AT + 1.0*SALE/AT + 1.4*RE/ AT + 1.2*WCAP/AT
Ohlson’s o-score = -1.32 - 0.407*ln(AT) + 6.03*(LT/AT) − 1.43*(ACT −LCT)/AT
+.0757*(LCT/ACT) − 2.37*NI/AT - 1.83*(PI + DP)/LT+ 0.285*1·[(NIt-1 <0 & NIt-2 <0)] 1.72*(LT > AT) − 0.521*(NI − NIt-1)/(|NI| + |NIt-1|)
Distance to default is calculated as the naive measure in Bharath and Shumway (2008):
S(-DD), where
`

DD:

^
UVW
T; W  X YZ[\] . `_ a
b_ √a
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f

eXf

0.05 + 0.25he 

E is the market value of equity (PRC*SHROUT in CRSP); F is the face value of debt,
defined as DLC + 0.5*DLTT; 7'(. is the firm’s buy-and-hold stock return over the previous
year; T is the time to maturity (one or two years); he is the standard deviation of the firm’s
stock price over the previous year; and hl is the approximation to the total volatility of
each firm.
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S&P credit rating upgrade is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm experiences a
ratings upgrade on long-term debt within a given period and zero otherwise. The S&P
credit rating variable used is SPLTICRM.
S&P credit rating downgrade is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm experiences a
ratings downgrade on long-term debt within a given period and zero otherwise. The S&P
credit rating variable used is SPLTICRM.
Bankruptcy or liquidation is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm goes through
bankruptcy or liquidation in a given period (Compustat DLRSN value of 2 or 3) and zero
otherwise.
ROA = OIBDP/AT
Tobin’s q = (AT + PRCC_F*CSHO – (SEQ + TXDITC – PSTK))/AT
Cash Flow/Assets = (IB + DP)/AT
Ln(Assets) = ln(AT)
Leverage = (DLC + DLTT)/(DLC + DLTT + PRCC_F*CSHO)
Sales/Assets = SALE/AT
Marginal Tax Rate is defined as MTR_BEFINT from John Graham’s marginal tax rate
file. When a data point is missing, I use the algorithm to estimate the book stimulated
marginal tax rate from Graham and Mills (2008): 0.331-0.075*1·[TXFED/PIDOM < 0.1] –
0.012*1·[TLCF >0] – 0.106*1·[PI<0] + 0.037*1·[|PIFO/PI|>0.05]. If TXFED/PIDOM is
missing, I substitute TXT/PI.
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Appendix 3. Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Distribution of firms in 2001 and in 2002 that qualified for the tax
refund policy around the kink point V*
2001 distribution of firms

2002 distribution of firms

Figure A2: Distribution of firms that qualified for the 2002 policy around the kink
point V*, by the duration of investment goods by industry
Long-duration-asset industries

Short-duration-asset industries
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Table A1: Sharp RKD
2002 Policy

Dependent variable = Investment
(1)

2009 Policy
Change in
Cash Ch. Cash (2011)
(2)
(3)

Change in
Change in
L.T. Debt
L.T. Debt
(2011)
(2010 & 2011)
(4)
(5)

0.145**
[0.0642]
(0.0295)

0.309
[0.186]
(0.105)

-0.494**
[0.209]
(0.0231)

-0.390**
[0.187]
(0.0435)

-0.444**
[0.191]
(0.0254)

Controls
Industry F.E.

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

Observations
R-squared

3,337
0.403

1,496
0.254

1,355
0.104

1,355
0.094

1,355
0.120

Change in slope (β1)

This table presents the coefficient β1 from empirical specifiation (1) and estimates the change in slope of the
outcome variable around the kink point. The coefficient estimate divided by 0.35 (the highest marginal tax
rate) equals a "sharp" RKD estimate of the effect of the tax refund on firm outcomes. Column 1 reports
results for investment as the dependent variable in the 2002 policy period and columns 2 through 5 report
results for the following dependent variables in the 2009 policy period: change in cash in 2010, change in
cash in 2011, change in long-term debt in 2011 and the cumulative 2-year change in long-term debt over 2010
and 2011. Regressions include a second-order polynomial in the assignment variable "V", industry fixed
effects at the Fama-French 48 level, and the pre-treatment controls Tobin's q, ROA, cash flow/assets,
sales/assets, leverage, the marginal tax rate, ln(assets), and a quadratic in stimulus losses. Standard errors
are clustered at the industry level and are reported in brackets. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **
and * indicate levels of 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance, respectively.
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Table A2: Robustness to Polynomial Choice
Polynomial Order:
Second Stage:
First Stage:

Two

Three

Two
(1)

One
(2)

Three
(3)

One
(4)

0.403***
[0.155]
(0.00953)

0.467***
[0.181]
(0.00980)

0.386**
[0.186]
(0.0379)

0.431**
[0.176]
(0.0145)

0.958*
[0.576]
(0.0963)

0.461
[0.730]
(0.528)

0.895
[0.550]
(0.104)

0.668
[0.532]
(0.210)

Change in Cash (2011)

-1.260**
[0.626]
(0.0440)

-1.165
[0.741]
(0.116)

-1.183*
[0.647]
(0.0674)

-1.186*
[0.680]
(0.0810)

Change in L.T. Debt (2011)

-1.542*
[0.828]
(0.0626)

-0.841
[0.736]
(0.253)

-1.677**
[0.842]
(0.0463)

-1.522*
[0.818]
(0.0627)

Change in L.T. Debt (2010 & 2011) -1.361**
[0.622]
(0.0285)

-0.473
[0.906]
(0.602)

-1.515**
[0.717]
(0.0345)

-1.540**
[0.725]
(0.0337)

+
+

+
+

+
+

2002 Policy
Investment

2009 Policy
Change in Cash (2010)

Controls
Industry F.E.

+
+

This table presents the coefficient β1 from empirical specification (2), the second-stage regression, and
estimates the effect of the tax refund on potential uses of the funds with varying orders of polynomials in
"V" in the second-stage and first-stage regressions. Each panel reflects a separate regression.
Dependent variables are reported in rows. Column 1 reports results for the preferred specification: a
second-order polynomial in V in the second stage [ΣPp=1 (Vit-1 - V*)p] and a second-order polynomial in
p

the excluded instrument [ΣPp=1 D·(Vit-1 - V*) ] in the first stage. Column 2 reports results for a a secondorder polynomial in V in the second-stage and a first-order polynomial in the excluded instrument in the
first-stage. Columns 3 and 4 report results for a third order polynomial in V in the second stage and a
third- and first-order polynomial in the excluded instrument in the first stage, respectively. Regressions
include industry fixed effects at the Fama-French 48 level, and the pre-treatment controls Tobin's q,
ROA, cash flow/assets, sales/assets, leverage, the marginal tax rate, ln(assets), and a quadratic in
stimulus losses. Standard errors are clustered at the Fama-French 48 industry level and are reported in
brackets. P-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate levels of 1 percent, 5 percent, and
10 percent significance, respectively.
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Table A3: Robustness to Varying Bandwidths
2002 Policy

Dependent variable =
Bandwidth Range:
Full Sample

Investment
(1)

2009 Policy
Change in
Change in Change in L.T. Debt
(2010)
Cash (2011)
(2011)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Change in
L.T. Debt
(2010 & 2011)
(5)

0.403***
[0.155]

0.958*
[0.576]

-1.542*
[0.828]

-1.260**
[0.626]

-1.361**
[0.622]

[-2750, 2750]

—

0.856*
[0.472]

-1.706**
[0.797]

-1.707**
[0.710]

-2.072**
[0.846]

[-2500, 2500]

—

0.512
[0.496]

-1.204
[0.747]

-1.413**
[0.683]

-1.338*
[0.799]

[-2250, 2250]

0.474***
[0.173]

0.134
[0.569]

-0.852
[0.758]

-1.844**
[0.797]

-2.201**
[0.977]

[-2000, 2000]

0.425*
[0.257]

0.11
[0.619]

-0.958
[0.890]

-2.072***
[0.766]

-2.823***
[1.089]

[-1750, 1750]

0.371
[0.267]

0.494
[0.764]

-1.543
[0.952]

-1.362
[0.946]

-1.53
[0.994]

[-1500, 1500]

0.485**
[0.217]

-0.0987
[0.882]

-1.331
[1.021]

-1.652*
[0.854]

-2.127**
[1.080]

[-1250, 1250]

0.915***
[0.349]

0.852
[0.816]

-1.273
[1.166]

-1.611
[1.078]

-0.355
[1.514]

[-1000, 1000]

0.662**
[0.331]

1.346
[0.863]

0.588
[1.709]

-1.668
[1.433]

0.162
[1.887]

[-750, 750]

0.915**
[0.377]

0.96
[0.702]

0.114
[1.139]

-0.199
[1.270]

0.218
[1.866]

[-500, 500]

1.772***
[0.653]

1.344
[1.062]

-0.946
[1.811]

-1.521*
[0.876]

-1.104
[2.092]

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

Controls
Industry F.E.

This table presents the coefficient β1 from empirical specifiation (2), the second-stage regression, and estimates the
effect of the tax refund on potential uses of the funds with varying bandwidths of the regression window. Each panel
reflects as separate regression. Column 1 reports results for investment as the dependent variable in the 2002 policy
period and columns 2 through 5 report results for the following dependent variables in the 2009 policy period: change
in cash in 2010, change in cash in 2011, change in long-term debt in 2011 and the cumulative 2-year change in longterm debt over 2010 and 2011. Regressions include a second-order polynomial in the assignment variable "V",
industry fixed effects at the Fama-French 48 level, and the pre-treatment controls Tobin's q, ROA, cash flow/assets,
sales/assets, leverage, the marginal tax rate, ln(assets), and a quadratic in stimulus losses. Standard errors are
clustered at the industry level and are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate levels of 1 percent, 5 percent, and
10 percent significance, respectively.
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Table A4: Excluding Hard-Hit Industries
2002 Policy
(Ex. Air & Telecom)

2009 Policy
(Ex. Homebuilders)
Change in
Change in
L.T. Debt
Cash (2011)
(2011)
(3)
(4)

Change in
L.T. Debt
(2010 & 2011)
(5)

Investment
(1)

Change in
Cash (2010)
(2)

Tax Refund

0.505*
[0.268]
(0.0592)

1.036
[0.664]
(0.119)

-1.48
[0.954]
(0.121)

-1.562**
[0.713]
(0.0286)

-1.685**
[0.687]
(0.0141)

Controls
Industry F.E.

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

Observations
R-squared

3,213
0.400

1,449
0.259

1,311
0.028

1,311
0.076

1,311
0.111

Dependent variable =

This table presents the coefficient β1 from empirical specifiation (2), the second-stage regression, and estimates the effect of
the tax refund on potential uses of the funds. Column 1 reports results for investment as the dependent variable in the 2002
policy period and columns 2 through 5 report results for the following dependent variables in the 2009 policy period: change in
cash in 2010, change in cash in 2011, change in long-term debt in 2011 and the cumulative 2-year change in long-term debt
over 2010 and 2011. Column 1 excludes firms in Fama-French industries 23 and 32: aircraft and communications. Columns
2 to 5 excludes firms in Fama-French industries 17 and 18: construction materials and construction. Regressions include a
second-order polynomial in the assignment variable "V", industry fixed effects at the Fama-French 48 level, and the pretreatment controls Tobin's q, ROA, cash flow/assets, sales/assets, leverage, market-to-book, the marginal tax rate,
ln(assets), and a quadratic in stimulus losses. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are reported in
brackets. P-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate levels of 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent
significance, respectively.
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Table A5: Tax Refund Allocation in the 2002 Policy Period
Panel A: Year After Tax Refund Receipt (2003 and 2004)

Dependent variable = Investment
(1)

Change in Change in
Cash
Debt
(2)
(3)

Payout
(4)

Other
Uses
(5)

Total
(6)

Tax Refund

0.182
[0.449]

0.613
[0.484]

1.128
[1.064]

-0.0898
[0.186]

0.333
[0.668]

-0.0905
[1.085]

Controls
Industry F.E.

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

Observations

2,952

2,952

2,952

2,952

2,952

2,952

R-squared

0.33

0.00

0.01

0.11

0.13

0.25

Payout

Other
Uses

Total

Panel B: Two-Year Total Effect After Tax Refund Receipt
Change in Change in
Dependent variable = Investment
Cash
Debt
Tax Refund

0.425
[0.642]

0.415
[0.523]

0.467
[0.892]

-0.146
[0.336]

0.771
[1.065]

0.997
[1.211]

Controls
Industry F.E.

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

Observations

2,952

2,952

2,952

2,952

2,952

2,952

R-squared

0.39

0.05

0.08

0.15

0.11

0.31

This table presents the coefficient β1 from empirical specifiation (2), the second-stage regression, and estimates the effect of the
tax refund on potential uses of the funds in the 2002 policy period. Panel A reports estimates for the year following tax refund
receipt (2003 and 2004) and Panel B reports estimates for the cumulative use of funds the two years after tax refund reciept. Other
uses are acquistions, change in short-term investments and change in investments. Total is the sum of all uses listed in columns
1 to 5. Regressions include a second-order polynomial in the assignment variable "V", industry fixed effects at the Fama-French
48 level, and the pre-treatment controls Tobin's q, ROA, cash flow/assets, sales/assets, leverage, the marginal tax rate,
ln(assets), and a quadratic in stimulus losses. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are reported in brackets. ***,
** and * indicate levels of 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance, respectively.
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Table A6: Investment, Financial Constraints, and Investment Opportunities:
Effects of the Tax Refund on Investment in the 2009 Policy Period
Panel A: Financial Constraints
Dependent Variable = Investment
Financially Constrained?

KZ Index
Yes
No
(1)
(2)

Payout
Yes
No
(3)
(4)

DFF
Yes
(5)

No
(6)

Tax Refund

-0.978
[0.880]

0.298
[0.360]

-1.157
[0.794]

-0.324
[0.409]

-1.065
[0.767]

-0.229
[0.333]

Controls
Industry F.E.

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

Observations
R-squared

355
0.44

356
0.50

939
0.44

557
0.46

1,087
0.41

406
0.52

Panel B: Investment Opportunities
Dependent Variable = Investment
Tobin's Q
High
Low
No
High Investment Opportunities? Yes
(1)
(2)

Multinational Domestic
Yes
No
(3)
(4)

Tax Refund

-0.702
[0.799]

-3.944
[3.277]

-0.581
[0.580]

-0.341
[0.274]

Controls
Industry F.E.

+
+

+
+

+
+

+
+

Observations
R-squared

373
0.39

374
0.00

551
0.47

942
0.42

This table presents the coefficient β1 from empirical specifiation (2), the second-stage regression, and estimates the effect of
the tax refund on investment. Panel A restricts the sample by three measures of firm financial constraints. Columns 1 and 2
show results for subsamples of firms in the top and bottom quartiles of the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index, respectively.
Columns 3 and 4 show results for subsamples of firms with zero and non-zero dividend issuance and stock repurchases,
respectively. Columns 5 and 6 show results for subsamples of firms for which total payouts to operating income is and is not
less than or equal to zero, respectively, as in Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011). Panel B restricts the sample by two
measures of firm investment opportunities. Columns 1 and 2 show results for subsamples of firms in the top and bottom
quartiles of Tobin's q, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 show results for firms with substantial foreign activity (foreign pre-tax
income greater than 5 percent of total pre-tax income in absolute value) and domestic firms, respectively. All financial
constraint and investment opportunity measures are calculated for the year prior to tax refund receipt. Regressions include a
second-order polynomial in the assignment variable "V", industry fixed effects at the Fama-French 48 level, and the pretreatment controls Tobin's q, ROA, cash flow/assets, sales/assets, leverage, the marginal tax rate, ln(assets), and a
quadratic in stimulus losses. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are reported in brackets. ***, ** and *
indicate levels of 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance, respectively.
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Appendix 3. Income Classes in the Consumer Expenditure Survey
Prior to 2004, the Consumer Expenditure Survey included only household income as directly
reported. Due to the large share of non-response to income questions, the CE currently uses
income imputation to fill in income blanks. In 2004 and 2005, the CE only published imputed data,
and starting in 2006, the CE started publishing both the imputed income data and the reported
data.
For this study, in order to maintain consistency across the sample period, I only include
observations for complete income reporters for the sample years 1998-2003 and 2006-2010. I
define complete income reporters as households that report non-zero income in at least one of
the following categories: wages and salaries; unemployment compensation; income from nonfarm
business, partnership or professional practice; farm income; Social Security payments or Railroad
Retirement income; Supplemental Security Income; welfare income; and pension income. Since
BLS only reports imputed income for 2004 and 2005, in those years, I exclude households for
which BLS reported that all of the income categories above had been imputed because the data
had been invalid blanks (data flags 2 or 5). To separate households into income classes, I use
total, before-tax income (code fincbefx for 1998-2003 and fincbefm for 2004 and 2005).
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